A Study of "Martyrs in a Time of Alienation"
Part I
In January 2008, Al-Fajr Media Center, an al-Qaida affiliated media group, released an extensive issue in its series, "Biographies of the Martyrs in the Land of Khorasan." The book -- in the summary translation used here -- consists of 120 brief biographies of men who died in the insurgency against Coalition forces and regional governments. The following is a brief analysis (in green) of the book's content based on a summary translation available through WNC (Dialog), see the "Introduction" post for record information.
The book opened with a dedication to Sayyid Qutb, Abdallah Azzam, and Abu−Mus'ab al−Zarqawi for their supposedly unique respective roles in guiding, reviving, and implementing jihad. The preface praised the role of jihad and the unique elevated status of martyrs in the eyes of God according to Islamic teachings. The book went on to give biographical accounts about a list of jihad martyrs who fell in Afghanistan. These accounts gave a glimpse of the martyrs' upbringing, their decision to join jihad, and their piousness and dedication to the cause of jihad throughout their jihadist endeavor.
Qutb, Azzam, and Zarqawi may initially appear to be an unlikely grouping of "martyrs" to commemorate, but actually the three fit well with the al-Qaida's self-imagining as Qutb's rightful heirs. It's a claim that stands in opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood, the group Qutb claimed leadership of at the time of his execution. Al Qaida is saying in essence that through the work of Abdullah Azzam and the recent leadership of al-Zarqawi, we are the legitimate jihadi movement.
The three men represent a continuum of ideas and action that fits well with the group's claim to represent "the Ummah of the Pen and Sword." (See WNC Accession # 17YG2WZ5 20080228.)
Ibrahim al−Muhajir al−Masri: His real name is Muhsin Bin Musa Bin Mitwalli Atwah from Egypt. He was an engineering graduate who had migrated to Iraq for work before he decided two years later to join the mujahidin in Afghanistan during the war against the Soviet invasion. He left Afghanistan for Sudan where he purportedly participated in the planning of US Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. Ibrahim al−Masri was described as an expert in explosives who spent much of his time experimenting in his laboratory and whose specialty was "engineering martyrdom operations" and "preparing martyrs." He was killed in a US air raid in Afghanistan.
The list begins with the confirmation of the death of an official suspect in the planning and operations of the 1998 US embassy bombings in Africa. Atwah's biography reads like many senior level al-Qaida members, including previous jihad experience during the Afghan-Soviet war. As with many senior level members, the bio tells us that Atwah was a trainer. It's apparently typical of the group that its most experienced members take on teaching roles. This learning loop keeps AQ's bench of skilled recruits full of future trainers. His biographical arch takes him from Egypt to Iraq to Afghanistan to Africa to Afghanistan.
Ibrahim al−Dagestani: His real name is Habib−Allah from Dagestan. Two years after his meeting with Chechen mujahidin, he went back to Dagestan to form his group of mujahidin and was sending recruits to Afghanistan for training. The public turned against Habib−Allah and his group and they were forced to flee Dagestan. Habib−Allah ended up in Afghanistan where he died in battle with the Pakistani military.
Habib-Allah appears to be the head of a jihadi group unrelated to al Qaida. He and his group are an example of the porous nature of jihadist insurgencies. Jihadi groups seek out regions where other jihadi groups are active, usually providing support wherever possible to each other. Issa al-Hindi describes just such activity in The Army of Madinah in Kashmir. Any area recognized as a legitimate jihad thus becomes a magnet for active violent jihadi movements, where members network, share capabilities, and build future relationships. This kind of "community" building practically guarantees another generation of regional warfare somewhere on earth.
Abrar (nickname): His name is Tariq from Kashmir. He fought in Afghanistan and was killed by the Pakistani military in Waziristan.
Tariq is an example of cross-over fighting I might expect from having two regional jihads -- Kashmir and Afghanistan -- with such a close operational distance. It is surprising we don't hear more about Kashmiri militants fighting in Afghanistan.
Abu−Ahmad al−Suri (nickname): His real name is Mahmud Bin Mustafa Bin Kamal al−Bakri from Aleppo, Syria. He joined jihad in Afghanistan and trained in Abu−Mus'ab al−Suri camp. His second trip to Afghanistan coincided with the US invasion and he was killed in Shahi−Kot, Afghanistan.
Al-Bakri's biography offers an example of a phenomenon that I noticed back in 2004. Far from being a "good" war that Arabs and other Muslims supported, the US invasion of Afghanistan was generating the same kind of movement of men and arms that we eventually saw develop in Iraq. Al-Bakri wasn't alone in his efforts to join a burgeoning front in Afghanistan. Willie Brigitte and the members of the Operation Crevice cell are just two examples of what appears to be a reactive phenomenon that has been around since the Afghan-Soviet war. Whenever there is a perceived act of aggression against a country commonly accepted as Muslim, a call-to-arms goes out and within months, a global movement of money and men begins to flow into the region.
The Iraq insurgency wasn't a unique reaction to American military activity in the Middle East. Rather, it was the latest in a line of regional jihads that appear to be a global reaction and response to any country perceived to be occupying a Muslim country. I've even identified a key mechanism in the creation of such incubation communities. However, that kind of in-depth analysis is not appropriate for a brief study like this. Suffice it to say that Al-Bakri apparently didn't get the memo that Afghanistan was supposedly a "good war."
Comments