A Study of "Martyrs in a Time of Alienation"
Part IX
In January 2008, Al-Fajr Media Center, an al-Qaida affiliated media group, released an extensive issue in its series, "Biographies of the Martyrs in the Land of Khorasan." The book -- in the summary translation used here -- consists of 120 brief biographies of men who died in the insurgency against Coalition forces and regional governments. The following is a brief analysis (in green) of the book's content based on a summary translation available through WNC (Dialog), see the "Introduction" post for record information.
Previous posts can be found here. This is Part IX.
“Tartarstan” is a broader region in the jihadi “map” than the current boundaries defined by the former Soviet republic. Thus, it’s difficult to determine where in “Tartarstan” this man originated, but it’s clear he had former military training. That must have given him an advantage in the camp culture of 90s-era Afghanistan. It makes me wonder how much AQ relies on the varied training experiences of some of its members, and how, if it can, count to their advantage.
Here we clearly have a senior member of Zawahiri’s retinue. He was probably counted among the members of the deep bench of potential leaders. He was trusted enough to know intimate details of Zawahiri’s life. Knowing that he was killed in an “air raid” suggests that our military engagements with Al Qaeda do have the advantage of clearing the bench. Perhaps the best method of bleeding the group is clearing the bench faster than it can be filled. We haven’t been doing that with much effectiveness lately, and with Al Qaeda finding secure regions of operation in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia it is likely that the bench could be refilled quite quickly.
Karachi stands out for me as a curious place to see Taliban training. Of all the major cities in Pakistan, this one is the farthest away from the NWFP and any likely location for Taliban training. This biography suggests a broad network of Taliban support, funding and training throughout Pakistan. It also suggests that elements of the Pakistani government showed indifference or open support for Al Qaeda and Taliban activities long before the current civil war broke out.
I’m unsure what “group of Abu-Abdallah al-Tatari” is describing, a “brigade” or cell within Al Qaeda or a regional jihadi group, but it’s clear that he was drawn to Saudi Arabia, probably for religious training, and networked with this group upon his return. Who were the Saudis influencing his radicalization? How did he come to Saudi Arabia? Understanding little known areas could help fill in gaps of knowledge of the global Salafist-Jihadist movement.
Not much to say about this person. It is interesting to see how much effort the editors of this document put into integrating Taliban members into their own narrative.
