A Study of "Martyrs in a Time of Alienation"
Part XI
In January 2008, Al-Fajr Media Center, an al-Qaida affiliated media group, released an extensive issue in its series, "Biographies of the Martyrs in the Land of Khorasan." The book -- in the summary translation used here -- consists of 120 brief biographies of men who died in the insurgency against Coalition forces and regional governments. The following is a brief analysis (in green) of the book's content based on a summary translation available through WNC (Dialog), see the "Introduction" post for record information.
Previous posts can be found here. This is Part XI.
Here again is the Western European connection. Where and to whom are these men going to receive the logistical support they need to make it to Afghanistan? And how much of this network is still intact in Spain and other countries? Is it possible for this network to reemerge if there are other operations in other parts of the world, like Somalia or Sudan?
Not much to comment on here.
Here is another example of someone who sought jihad against the US invasion of Afghanistan. I wonder what would have happened if we hadn’t gone into Iraq. The West’s accepted Iraq narrative: that it “enflamed” the radicals and created more seems less likely once it’s understood that Afghanistan (considered by some as a “good” war) was doing the same exact thing. The fact of the matter is even humanitarian actions in predominately Muslim countries will be interpreted as an “invasion” of Muslim land and warrant the same exact response we have received in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Here is an interesting bio of a career jihadi. It highlights the role Central Asia’s porous borders and borderless ethnicities play in fill the jihadi ranks. I suspect that even if no Arabs sought jihad in Afghanistan, AQ and the Taliban would not lack for recruits from regional countries.
An example here of a North African cadre, led by abu Layth, and obviously developed with the intention of strengthening the North African groups. In this I wonder if one of AQ’s strategies is to create the next generation jihadis and rather have them all fight and die in Afghanistan, instead send some back to their home regions. In this way they are developing a new generation of global jihadis for the next five to ten years.
