A Study of "Martyrs in a Time of Alienation" (XII)

A Study of "Martyrs in a Time of Alienation"
Part XII

In January 2008, Al-Fajr Media Center, an al-Qaida affiliated media group, released an extensive issue in its series, "Biographies of the Martyrs in the Land of Khorasan."  The book -- in the summary translation used here -- consists of 120 brief biographies of men who died in the insurgency against Coalition forces and regional governments.  The following is a brief analysis (in green) of the book's content based on a summary translation available through WNC (Dialog), see the "Introduction" post for record information.

Previous posts can be found here.  This is Part XII.

Al−Zubayr al−Turki: Born in Turkey, he traveled to Afghanistan where he received his first military training. He tried to join Al−Qa'ida in Iraq after the fall of the Taliban but was unable to find his way through Iran. He returned to Afghanistan where he later dies [sic] in an aim [sic] bombing.

Al-Zubayr’s bio evokes questions of Iranian facilitation.  How much of this post-US invasion migration did the Iranian permit, and how much were they redirecting.  We they preventing all Afghan-based jihadis from transiting to Iraq, were they making some offers they just couldn’t refuse?

Zayd al−Dagestani: He joined his father in Afghanistan where he trained and fought until he was killed in an air bombing.

How would we characterize a father-son jihadi team?  It is clear that for some of these jihadis, they were raised into the ideology rather than being “radicalized” by some outside influence.  How much of these cradle radicals exist within AQ’s cadres?  And is it a recent phenomenon?

Abu−Sa'd al−Kandahari al−Najdi: His name Turki al−Dahish from Saudi Arabia. He traveled to Afghanistan and received his training in Al−Faruq camp in Kandahar. He returned to Afghanistan for a second time after the US invasion and was among a group of fighters assigned to form jihadist cells and promote jihad in Jalalabad where he was killed.

Originally a member of the 90s-era cadre, al-Dahish probably represented an ideologically trained jihadi.  It’s interesting that the bio notes that part of his responsibilities was the recruitment in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban.  This was clearly part of a strategy to regroup and reform capabilities soon after the dust settled.  It’s interesting to note that they felt safe enough to operate a recruitment effort inside of a country so soon after its government fell.  This is the kind of behavior that needs to be curtailed in future post war efforts.

Samarqand al−Urduni: His name is Habis Bin−Abdallah Bin−Falah from Jordan. He took part in the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan and later joined the so−called Al−Khilafah Group (Jama'at Al−Khilafah) in Peshawar after the civil war broke out. Habis Bin−Abdallah tried to return to the US where he once preached but was forced to change his plan when the September 11 attacks in the US took place. He traveled to China, Bangladesh, and back to Pakistan where he was killed in a raid by Pakistani forces in Waziristan.

Here we have an astonishing admission of a career jihadi desiring to “return” to the United States.  Just when he had been to the United States and what he had done here goes undiscussed, but it’s clear that within the cadres of al-Qaeda’s “foot soldiers” are men who wish to dedicate effort to “preaching” as much as fighting.  The line between the two is very thin; however, we’re still inadequate at describing the general lack of distinction between the two, particularly in Western courts of law. I’ve been unable to identify the “Al-Khilafah Group.” 

Sahm al−Ta'ifi: His name is Muhammad al−Zahrani from Saudi Arabia. He traveled to Kashmir where he trained then joined Abu−al−Layth al−Libi's group in eastern Afghanistan where he died in a battle against government forces.

Why would this Saudi travel to Kashmir first?  We hear now about the training camps along the Afghan-Pakistan border.  Yet this might not have always been the case.  Apparently, earlier on in the Afghan-Pakistan conflict al-Qaeda cadres were training in Pakistan-controlled paramilitary camps probably connected to the ISI or Lashkar-e-Tayyiba. Of AQs training and personnel assets, how remains on the other side of Pakistan, away from America’s presence?