I've been reading reports of Abu Mohammed al-Maqdisi's increasing moderation since the "Zarqawi crisis" of 2005-06. If by moderation you mean clarifying the permissibility of insurgency and murder, then well, I guess the guy has morphed into a fuzzy bunny, but I wouldn't invite him to speak at the local food co-op any time soon. In a June interview to with Wa'il al-Battiri for Amman al-Sabil we have a good idea of where Maqdisi has been heading since the descent of AQ in Iraq into a GIA-style bloodbath. AQ Central's strategic thinking parallels Maqdisi, undergoing similar modifications at least since Zawahiri's 2005 letter to Zarqawi. It's seen more recently in the Taliban's revised rules of engagement.
AQAP's assassination attempt on KSA's counterterrorism chief, Prince Muhammed bin Nayif, could be interpreted through this strategy. AQ gains more by targeting their attacks on Saudi leaders, counterterrorism officials, and other security elements, and by plotting attacks on infrastructure, not the general populace. See coverage here, here and here.
I'm not a sociologist, but I do know enough about the Arab Middle East to recognize the general strengths and weaknesses of those societies. Family is still very important, and the individual's ties to their family counts for much of the social cohesion in those mostly-failing states. AQ generally looses support when they target civilians, or in the case of Iraq, entire families, because such attacks tear at the heart of social cohesion and stability. Conversely, most governments in the Arab Middle East are weak, unreliable, and disconnected from the general populace. By concentrating operations on military and security elements within weak governments AQ has learned to target the softest spot on the beast (see The Management of Savagery, 2005). And considering some of its recent strategic success, it is an effective strategy so far.
This is why I believe the June interview illuminates a significant and troubling trend. Maqdisi spends most of the time clarifying past misconceptions and false statements. Far from moderating his views, he's honing them.
From the article introduction
Source: BBC Monitoring Middle East. London: Jun 5, 2009. ProQuest document 1740306621.
AQAP's assassination attempt on KSA's counterterrorism chief, Prince Muhammed bin Nayif, could be interpreted through this strategy. AQ gains more by targeting their attacks on Saudi leaders, counterterrorism officials, and other security elements, and by plotting attacks on infrastructure, not the general populace. See coverage here, here and here.
I'm not a sociologist, but I do know enough about the Arab Middle East to recognize the general strengths and weaknesses of those societies. Family is still very important, and the individual's ties to their family counts for much of the social cohesion in those mostly-failing states. AQ generally looses support when they target civilians, or in the case of Iraq, entire families, because such attacks tear at the heart of social cohesion and stability. Conversely, most governments in the Arab Middle East are weak, unreliable, and disconnected from the general populace. By concentrating operations on military and security elements within weak governments AQ has learned to target the softest spot on the beast (see The Management of Savagery, 2005). And considering some of its recent strategic success, it is an effective strategy so far.
This is why I believe the June interview illuminates a significant and troubling trend. Maqdisi spends most of the time clarifying past misconceptions and false statements. Far from moderating his views, he's honing them.
From the article introduction
Al-Maqdisi was released [from prison] on 12 March 2008. The media reported that the security authorities set the condition that he would not give any press interviews - an order by which he abided. Over the past few months he refused to give statements to the press, leading to a great deal of controversy.From the interview: On takfir
In this interview, given more than a year after his release, Al-Maqdisi touches on many stances that he adopts or calls for, refuting extremist views on takfir [holding other Muslims to be infidel] that are attributed to him. He also deals with many other issues.
[Al-Battiri] Concerning the issues of takfir to which you alluded, do you not think that certain youths display their ignorance by talking about these issues? Indeed, many of them wrote discourses and made allegations that tarnished the image of the movement. Because of them the notion spread that this movement holds the majority of people to be infidels.From the interview: On civilian Muslim targets
[Al-Maqdisi] Yes, some of the young men with deficient knowledge might make such an error. Therefore, as I have said, I give the youth advice and I urge them to seek knowledge. This would save them from the pitfalls of extremism. I wrote my book Al-Waqafat [Stances] in which I offered advice to the youth on practical issues. I also gave them advice on religious studies and faith- related issues in my book Al-Risalah Al-Thalathiniyah Fi Al-Tahdhir Min Akhta al-Takfir [Thirty Examples Warning Against Wrong Takfiri Practices]. In this book, I mentioned in detail the conditions and prohibitions concerning takfir. I warned against extremism in takfir and drew attention to 33 examples of either well known or grave takfiri practices, which I did not want the youths to slip into.
[Al-Battiri] Given the bombings that occur here and there in countries around the world, can you speak to us about the inviolability of the blood of Muslims in Islamic shari'ah, given that some might blow up an entire building just to kill one or two soldiers?And,
[Al-Maqdisi] No doubt God the legislator held the Muslim's blood, property, and honour to be inviolable. In a reliably-proven saying of the Prophet - peace and blessings of God be upon him - at the inviolable city, and in the inviolable month on the day of the major pilgrimage, he said: "Your blood and property will be as inviolable to you as this day, this month, and this city, until you meet with your God on doomsday." The Prophet said: "Have I given my message?" They replied: "Yes." He said: "God be my witness. Let those present inform those who are absent. So many serve as conveyers of warnings but many others would not convey what they hear. Therefore, do not become infidels after me, each striking the neck of the other."
Our ulema said that violating the blood of a Muslim is a great iniquity. The iniquity of letting 1,000 infidels escape is smaller than the sin of shedding a drop of blood of any Muslim. Therefore, one should not be lenient about the sin of shedding the blood of Muslims based on suspicion, jihad, or other things. Indeed, the blood and properties of disobedient Muslims cannot be violated even if they commit iniquities. It is our duty to call them into religion and try to bring them from darkness to light and not to engage with them in battles.
I have written on this many times and I dissociated myself from the undisciplined operations that others commit outside the bounds of shari'ah - operations that result in thousands of victims and in which much blood is shed without any legitimate benefits to jihad or Muslims.
[Al-Battiri] What about the bombing of cinema houses?
[Al-Maqdisi] If this is intended to kill the iniquitous, then this is forbidden and a crime that is impermissible in any way. It is not a legitimate means of fighting vice. The killing of such disobedient people as a form of punishment is an injustice, transgression, and infringement on the word of God. It is an illegitimate punishment. Even if the attacks do not kill anyone, they are still mistakes in terms of shari'ah policy and priorities. Bombing movie theatres does not stop disobedience. Some youths tried this and they were given long prison terms, spending the primes of their lives in jail, and eventually coming out of prison without any achievements. Moreover, this also means opening a confrontation with the public, who have the right to have us work with them in Islamic preaching and not in fighting and killing.
Source: BBC Monitoring Middle East. London: Jun 5, 2009. ProQuest document 1740306621.
