Making Sense of Jihad

A Study of "Martyrs in a Time of Alienation" (VI)

A Study of "Martyrs in a Time of Alienation"
Part VI

In January 2008, Al-Fajr Media Center, an al-Qaida affiliated media group, released an extensive issue in its series, "Biographies of the Martyrs in the Land of Khorasan."  The book -- in the summary translation used here -- consists of 120 brief biographies of men who died in the insurgency against Coalition forces and regional governments.  The following is a brief analysis (in green) of the book's content based on a summary translation available through WNC (Dialog), see the "Introduction" post for record information.

When I first began the series last summer, I anticipated covering 4-5 biographies per post, and that, as a result, it would take a while to get through the entire document.  However, life got in the way of a good idea, and I stopped in August of 2008.  My goal now is to complete the study, not because I've had reader clamoring for more, but rather because I hate leaving things unfinished.  

Previous posts can be found here.  This is Part VI.

Abu−Bakr al−Waziri: His name is Nawaz from Waziristan. He trained in Abu−al−Layth al−Libi's camp. He participated in battles against Pakistani forces and was subsequently killed in a missile attack in eastern Afghanistan.

There’s not much to comment on here, only to note that it appears that AQ prepped some men to fight Pakistani troops and some to fight Americans.  If this is so, then what does it say about its possible ground strategies?

Abu−al−Bara al−Sharqi: His name is Fahd Bin−Ibrahim al−Ibrahimi from Saudi Arabia. He participated in the war in Bosnia−Herzegovina and was arrested upon his return to Saudi Arabia. He traveled to Afghanistan after September 11 attacks in the US and participated in the publication of "The Vanguards of Khorasan" magazine. He died in an attack in eastern Afghanistan.

Here we have an example of two typical blurry lines seen in the both the 90s-era Afghan Arabs and this current generation.  First is the blurry line between jihadi media and activity on the battlefield. Al-Sharqi is described here as an individual who was involved in the production of the Taliban’s journal.  Here, too, is the blurry operational line between AQ and the Taliban.  In al-Sharqi we see one of many Saudi “career” jihadis working with the Taliban toward the same goal.

Abu−al−Bara al−Maqdisi: His name is Izz−al−Din al−Maqdisi from Syria. He was a military trainer in Kandahar and Kabul before he was forced to flee to the eastern region of Afghanistan after the US invasion. He died in one of the battles [incomplete].

Once again we have an example of the toll the initial US invasion took at that first generation of Afghan Arabs, many of who were seasoned “career” jihadis. The fact that he was a military trainer suggests that he had previous formal training (perhaps Syrian army) or had fought in Afghanistan against the Soviets.

Bilal al−Maghribi: His name was Abd−al−Aziz Buzlaf from Morocco. He traveled to Afghanistan from Spain and fought alongside pro−Taliban forces. After the demise of the Taliban government, he fled to the tribal area in eastern Afghanistan where he was later killed in Jalalabad where he was assigned with reorganizing and recruiting for prop−Taliban [sic] and Al−Qa'ida.

In the activity of this North African, we see the AQ author telling us that one of their goals was the reorganization of the group.  This suggests to me that AQ leadership may have anticipated the possibility that their Afghan operation might be broken up and maintained some contingency plans to reorganize once the dust settled.  Did US/NATO planners anticipate this possibility when they before or during the invasion?  If so, what went wrong?  If not, then perhaps it should be considered in any future large-scale actions. It’s not enough to destroy the safe-haven.

Abu−Turab al−Pakistani: Born in Punjab, Pakistan, he received his first military training in Kashmir where he fought until he joined the Taliban in Afghanistan. He fled to the tribal areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan until he was later killed in an ambush that targeted US convoys.

Al-Pakistani’s brief bio highlights the deep connections between the 90s-era Kashmir conflict and AQ.  I explore this in my study of Issa al-Hindi’s Army of Madinah in Kashmir.  Al-Hindi was AQ’s emir in the UK, but he earned his jihadi creds in Kashmir fighting for Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (aka the Army of Madinah). It also hints at the strategy of Pakistan’s ISI, which bankrolls and supports both Lashkar (under its myriad of new names) and the Taliban. It operates an expansionist policy against its two more powerful neighbors: Iran and India.  Also, the tactic of convoy disruption was used in Kashmir, and though common in many wars fought in mountainous regions, could share many of the operational characteristics used to target the Indian army.

Under a Beautiful Kashmiri Moon, Part XI

(Prelude , Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, Part 5, Part 6, Part 7, Part 8, Part 9, Part 10)

“Realistically and logically speaking…”

In the late 1990s, as the Taliban solidified its control over Afghanistan, their problems instituting shariah and executing the Islamist ideals of a true Islamic state, generated many questions that Islamist strategists hadn’t even considered. Islamists living in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and worldwide, were faced with the hard challenge of winning.  For the first time, they had to make Qutb’s concept of hakimiyah work in the real world.  Therefore, Al-Hindi’s discussion of the possibility of “winning” the Kashmir jihad, is not a fantasy.  These were hot issues in the wake of the Taliban’s ascendancy. Some idealogues were more strident than others.  Al-Hindi clearly supports the pragmatists within the movement.

I speculate that Al-Hindi could have sat in on classes taught by men like Al-Suri or one of Al Qaeda’s more prominent scholars.  In Army, he shares some of their ideas of how to make a system of government work under many of the principles developed and espoused by radical Islamists since the 1950s, especially the work of Sayyid Qutb, specifically hakimiyah, or the total sovereignty of God.

But he also reflects some the changing attitudes toward the idealistic Islamic state, no doubt learned from the Taliban’s tussles with the international community.  He takes some of these lessons to heart when discussing the possibility of winning the Kashmir jihad.  He gives an example, “…for those who subscribe to the theory that necessitates fully implementing the Shariah within three days of subduing any given land, should carefully consider certain facts…”

Take the idea of Islamist control of India:

After a lapse of three days, failing a one hundred percent complete submission, should we embark on beheading every single Hindu throughout this vast country?!  This is what this kind of staunch thought pattern inevitably entails.  (page 110)

He advances the concept of creating a safe haven – Dar-ul-Islam – first, and then incrementally building an Islamic state. 

“Only then will we be able to emulate the great Muslim forces of old to the letter of the law – until then we are relegated to following the spirit of the law in many ways.  In effect, a lesser of the two evils scenario.” (page 111)

His pragmatism informs a later section where he describes the “Benefits and Costs” of the Kashmir jihad, or as he writes, “there is usually a flip side to the coin.”  The positive aspects include Kashmir’s role as a “destination…for those who may have never been involved or subjected to a Guerilla Warfare type of environment.”  It’s also a “reasonable destintation to make contacts with other Mujahideen.”  And in the border offensives, Al-Hindi sees them as a satisfactory way for the previously semi-experienced or well trained individual to gain some real exposure.” (Pages 124-125)

In Al-Hindi’s eyes, the all-encompassing negative aspect to the Kashmir jihad is the Pakistani government’s own cynical use of the Kashmir jihad as a means of “diverting the national threat in their own home front,” by sending “sincere” young men to fight in the Pakistani army’s efforts in Kashmir, “performing the country’s ‘dirty work.’” He continues:

The government of Pakistan is thus technically killing tow birds with on stone through the maximum manipulation of all this compound ignorance which exists among the ranks of her devout, and yet easily impressionable native Mujahideen.” (page 126)

Under a Beautiful Kashmiri Moon, Part X

(Prelude , Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, Part 5, Part 6, Part 7, Part 8, Part 9)

“All to eager..”

Al-Hindi’s concluding thoughts put the Kashmiri conflict into a narrative Frame that has been a part of the radical Islamist mindset since Hassan al-Banna.  It took on overtly political forms in the 70s.  Abdullah Azzam transformed it into a global movement in the 1980s. New media – and several regional jihads -- modernized it in the 1990s.  The Internet and 9-11 brought it to mainstream Muslim audiences. 

What are the rhetorical elements of the Frame?  I only have an incomplete answer here, but briefly, the elements of the Frame include:

1. Innocent Muslims (they are always the victims)
2. Unwarranted Aggression (by non-Muslims)
3. Accounts of atrocities committed against innocent Muslims
4. Other eager young men have joined to just cause
5. Money is needed to alleviate the suffering of innocent Muslims

In a war of ideas – dissembling the credibility of the Frame would be key to blunting the influence of jihadi media, and, more important, the credibility of the jihadi leaders.  The Frame’s primary role is to maintain itself, as Al-Hindi writes

Regrettably, it seems that in contemporary times, this phenomenon of systematic savage attack after attack that has been unleashed on this shattered nation is still yet to educate  many peoples.  Young educated Muslim males in particular seem to be all too eager to clutch hold of their passports and backpacks with borrowed monies and leap over onto the grounds of these defensive type Jihad. (page 105)

Later on, he insists that there is no other word to describe the Kashmir insurgency.  “In retrospect,” he writes, “it is hard to see that the war that is transpiring today in the State of Jammu and Kashmir can be classified as anything but a Jihad.” Actually the following pages offer some of the more interesting insights on jihad -- definition, roles within, etc – given by a member of the “emir club” that I discussed earlier.

As a thinker, Al-Hindi is by no means as learned as a “career” strategist like Abu Musab al-Suri, and he is in no league with Al Qaeda’s cadre of Islamic scholars, ulema.  However, he doesn’t need to be.  As an emir his role is operational: identify targets, recruit young men, raising money.  However, an emir also needed to make informed decisions about targets and tactics in order that they stay in line with Al Qaeda’s interpretation of Islamic principles; therefore, some knowledge of shariah, of strategy and ideology is always needed.

When he begins to explore the hypothetical possibility of success in Kashmir, he’s only doing something that could have been part of his training.  However it also shows a pragmatism that perhaps was part of his generation of leaders.  Of the establishment of an Islamic state, or as he says, “…a true hegemonic Islamic system of government wherein Allah is Sovereign,” he suggests could come about through “…an evolutional process of gradation.” 

Under a Beautiful Kashmiri Moon, Part IX

(Prelude , Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, Part 5, Part 6, Part 7, Part 8)

“While we dream of jihad”

The book’s main narrative ends at about page 97.  Al-Hindi use the remaining fifty pages or so as an informal, extended appendix, to once again place the Kashmiri jihad into context.  If the preliminary material presumed to give the historical frame for the conflict, the succeeding material offers an ideological and theological frame. 

The part of the “appendix” claims to be a diary of a mujahideen who Al-Hindi knows personally.  There is no way to prove its authenticity, but Al-Hindi’s opening flourish immediately preceding the diary is an excellent crystallization of the Jihadi mindset:

While we dream of Jihad and some deny it, while other explain it away, and yet others frown upon it to hide their own weakness and reluctance towards it, here is a snapshot from the diary of a mujahid who fulfilled his dream to be on the battlefield.  Bo doubt, Jihad is part of our noble Deen and holds a lofty position in worship.

The diary is brief, and Al-Hindi reminds us that the author (“an ex Canadian soldier”) is still alive, not so for Abu Aadam “who hailed from America.”  He’s killed.  He ends the chapter with several popular passages from religious texts proving the blessedness of martyrdom.

Under a Beautiful Kashmiri Moon, Part VIII

(Prelude , Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, Part 5, Part 6, Part 7)

“A heartfelt brotherhood”

Al-Hindi follows accounts of “military” engagements -- with their obvious appeal to young men – with accounts of winter hardships, hyperbolic accounts of “atrocities” committed by Indian forces – torture (pages 83-86), mass rapes (pages 71-83), forced conscription (page 86), etc – as an appeal for financial support.  The audience would be men with money who could support the mujahideen’s “noble efforts.”

He also dismisses accusations that Mujahideen were behind the “ kidnapping of western holiday-makers in recent times” which he describes as “heavily media promulgated.”  Of course, this is lie.  The story of the six kidnapped Westerners reads like a textbook case of jihadi strategy to intimidate Western powers and create economic chaos within a regional jihad.  Three separate incidents over several days in July 1995, targeting Western hikers for kidnapping.  One escaped a few days later. Another was beheaded in August 1995.  The others have never been recovered.

Al-Hindi’s accounts of atrocities are a common rhetorical tool used in jihadi media.  It’s not propaganda, per se, but an effort to persuade through exaggeration.  The rhetorical approach (for lack of a better term) appeals the raw nerve of Muslim identity --common among radical Islamists -- that associates Muslims with perpetual suffering at the hands of others.  Jihad media producers have for decades distorted real events in order to exploit the spirit of charity common among practicing Muslims. 

Oddly, Al-Hindi then goes on to give vignettes of “heartfelt brotherhood” among mujahideen that include acts of hyper-violence and depravity.  There’s a Spring 1996 account of one Abu Hebat who in an attempt to kidnap an Indian soldier receives some resistance from the victim:

Finally, their grappling with each other subsided when Abu Hebat fired a round into the head of the army man.  With his victory complete, he beheaded him and returned to border sector Dawdunyal. (page 90)

This is, I believe, an attempt at humor.

There are others.

Under a Beautiful Kashmiri Moon, Part VII

(Prelude , Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, Part 5, Part 6)

“The Main Action Party and the Covering Party”

So far, Al-Hindi has been discussing harassment and incursion attacks along the Line of Control.  Now he turns his attention to acts inside Kashmir, including ambushes and attacks on fortified positions. 

Here Al-Hindi shows off some of his “military” experience, by describing the mujahideen’s tactics in these more complex, coordinated efforts:

Various internal teams will be set up inside the unit as a whole, each being assigned a specific function of duty and directive to strictly adhere to be the commander in charge of the onset.  In an ambush, for example, there will normally be two main groups, namely the Main Action Party and the Covering Party. (page 56)

Again, his readers were young men who have expressed interest in volunteering for the jihad, and I could see how they find adventure and an allure in “military speak.”  When Al-Hindi wrote Army, the jihad media had been used to recruit and fund regional jihads for almost 20 years.  These young men would have been familiar with videos from Chechnya and Bosnia showing military training and paramilitary actions.  Army shares the same rhetoric as those videos, in written form. 

It also shows off his own leadership creds, an important factor for building credibility within the local movement (in this case the UK) for recruiting and fund raising purposes, and within Al Qaeda where internal ideological struggles and personality clashes appear to be common.  Here he writes about the essential role of what he talks about the “Flank protection group:”

This is a very essential unit and is something that is not required in Guerrilla war situation but also in Conventional warfare and, contrary to popular belief, also in Urban guerrilla war.  Mostly devised for use in a raid rather than ambush, this team will be dispatched to any neighboring enemy camps that are within the vicinity…(page 59)

There is also a hint here of the environment bred by a regional jihad where more than one jihadi group could recruit and operate, sometimes as rivals, sometimes as friends. 

…exchanging of weaponry between different Mujahideen groups has and will always be done, till now there is not other way to procure arms.  A world of mention, Mujahideen from different groups will on many an occasion unit and perform an action against the military together. (page 61)

The complexity of the relationships between groups has never been fully understood in the West, but couldn’t be more important. It shows up in numerous areas of counterterrorism strategy, such as federal prosecutions where connections between individuals can appear loose or non-existent and where rules of evidence need to build a case beyond a reasonable doubt.  Explaining connections between what appear to be unrelated groups can be key to winning a prosecutions in money laundering cases, but are often impossible to pull-off because those connections appear to be so loose.

It also highlights an aspect of Al-Hindi’s job as an Al Qaeda emir that may not have been obvious at first; that is, he not only had to motivate young men to volunteer and old men to donate, he also had to compete for their attention with other Islamist-Jihadist groups.

Under a Beautiful Kashmiri Moon, Part VI

(Prelude , Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, Part 5)

“The machine of the Indian heathen army.”

Al-Hindi moves on to discuss mujahideen harassment tactics and the Indian army’s counter-insurgency response.  The mujahideen’s harassment activity, he writes, force the Indian military “to live a permanent state of challenge and apprehensiveness.”  Though he doesn't say,  the goal of mujahideen activity in Kashmir appears to have been to  maintain pressure on the Indian military in a defined and directed low-intensity conflict.  Far from being an organic response to "occupation" it was -- and still is -- a mill or factory for creating terrorists and achieving the long term strategic goal of ending Indian control of Kashmir.

After reading some of the narrative’s details, it becomes clear why Al Qaeda promotes members who have had previous experience – especially leadership experience – in one of the world’s regional jihads, like Kashmir or Chechnya.  The young men who volunteer to fight a regional jihad develop skills in security and communication, explosives training and “application,” command and control responsibilities.

In one passage he describes in general some of the counterintelligence tactics the mujahideen use to thwart Indian efforts to collect tactical information:

The army is able to eavesdrop upon the dialogue of the resistance by tuning into the same frequency and channels that the Mujahideen habitually utilize on their wireless sets…It is therefore imperative for the resistance to constantly utilize cryptic forms of speech and moreover, the ensure that discourse is kept slight in order to safeguard the tracing of their point and hides… (page 50)

It’s not just tactical military information being guarded and sought.  Both sides use psy-ops tactics, what Al-Hindi describes here as “propaganda.”

Inside Occupied Kashmir there is also correspondence between the pro-active Mujahideen and army over the wireless sets.  The army constantly bombards the airwaves with music and lyrics, which usually carry a lewd content…[the army] have resorted to usage of the foulest slang derogatory remarks.  In an answer to all this, the Mujahideen often manage to strike many a ‘raw nerve’ when they reply through Nashids (Islamic songs)…”

Again the reader must remind himself that Al-Hindi is of Indian descent.  His reconditioning is so thoroughly complete that he has come to see Indians as essentially a sub-human enemy. “The enemy crackdown,” he writes on page 53, “is the simple reaction of a desperate and wretched foe who is violently struggling to keep order…that is the machine of the Indian heathen army.”

Under a Beautiful Kashmiri Moon, Part V

(Prelude , Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4)

“Deep Inside”

After a brief flourish on the importance of guides, Al-Hindi describes “various types of offensive Guerilla war tactics” employed by the Mujahideen.  The list of three reads like a three-bullet power point slide on the primary assault tactics facing Coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Al-Hindi describes the first tactic as the “simplest.”  The programmed time delay or PTD explosive box, buried in the soil and “left to explode.”  He continues:

Over the past few years, this simple but effective type of border incursion has proved to be very successful.  Each box usually weighs around four kilograms apiece and depending upon the size of the enemy post, the appropriate type and amount of explosive material will be used.

This may represent the kind of hands-on technique and know-how passed on to Iraqi and Afghan mujahideen.  Taken to the present day the same design and tactic was modified to accommodate improvements in remote detonation techniques and the detonators themselves.

Another type of border mission Al-Hindi lists is the use of BM rockets against fixed Indian positions.  “This type of action is a little more difficult,” he writes,

…due to the fact that BM missiles are employed, each weighing 20 kilograms.  For the unit which is carrying out this particular border mission fatigue factors are understandably higher.  Also setting up and aiming accurately is very tricky and take expertise as still hanging pendulums must be employed, etc.” (page 35)

BM rocket attacks are regularly employed against Coalition positions in Afghanistan.  Such attacks are often features in jihadi media videos that regularly come out of Afghanistan. 

Download recent examples from (where else?) Archive.org here, here and here.

The third type of offensive tactic Al-Hindi describes is regularly seen in both Afghanistan and Algeria.  It is the harassment or ambush attack that includes the use of remote controlled explosives to target approaching convoys, and mixed use of RPGs and gunfire.

All three techniques are described as “an excellent source of experience for those newly trained Mujahideen recruits” and represent for Al-Hindi effective methods of in a war of attrition along the LOC.  Inside Kashmir -- what he calls “Occupied Territories” -- there is a very different set of circumstances.

In the chapter Al-Hindi calls “Deep Inside,” he describes a life of perpetual motion and hardship through rural, highland terrain, but also jungle and cultivated landscape.  The images here would repeat themselves in the videos (like this one) produced by Al Qaeda’s affiliate in North Africa, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb which often show teams of young men hiking up mountains, traversing creeks, and cutting through jungle-like forests.  “The…Mujahideen are homeless,” he writes

…they are poor, they are sometimes unsure of when or where their next meal will originate from.  Their existence inside Occupied Kashmir is one that requires living off the land.  In addition, they must depend on any charity (which when possible they will nearly always endeavor to pay for) that their Lord may send them down via the goodwill of the Muslim civilians of Kashmir.  (page 41)

The rhetorical continuity between Al-Hindi’s writing and current jihadi video production speaks to the movement’s need to continuously identify and develop new streams of blood and money. 

He describes deplorable conditions among the mujahideen fighters, including living with lice-infested clothes and suffering sores due to dramatic changes in nutrition.  However, he reiterates the sacred nature of the act

The Mujahideen suffer in many ways, but it is they who will reap magnificent rewards in the hereafter in a ways which others cannot, as has been told to use through many an authentic narration.

He goes on to quote from the hadith Bukhari 2577, and puts the deprivations of the mujahideen, and any cooperation they receive from the local population, in the context of defensive jihad.

Under a Beautiful Kashmiri Moon, Part IV

(Prelude , Part 1, Part 2, Part 3)

“The final barrier”

In my previous Army posts I mentioned that Al-Hindi is writing for two key audiences: idealistic young men willing to fight and old men with money willing to donate.  This is what I call “Blood and Money,” the fuel of any regional jihad.  In order to generate sympathy, he has to argue that the Kashmir jihad is fundamentally a defensive jihad.  And as a defensive jihad it obligates individual Muslim to support the cause, what is called fard ‘ayn.

In the initial sections of Army, he makes the case for Kashmir as a defensive jihad.  He follows his justification, by now describing the efforts of the mujahideen.  The audience here are the young men who may see the deprivations and dangers Al-Hindi describes as noble struggle.

Al-Hindi describes the process of “launching.”  This is the initial trip the mujahideen take over the Line of Control [LOC] in order to infiltrate into Kashmir.  To his credit he doesn’t sugar coat the process.  Indian and Pakistani (and Mujahideen) engagements along the LOC or in Kashmir are at extremely high elevations [10,000 ft and higher].

The Mujahideen, are completely manual, sometimes even crawling like babies on steep includes and declines.  Many of the methods are defunct, as the do not have modern technology on their side…(page 20)

And this

…the journey inside is of an extremely toilsome nature, a lengthy one.  The Mujahideen, will sleep in sub zero temperatures and ration their food.  Sometimes even air may be thin, thus causing altitude sickness which cannot be avoided due to the speed of their accelerated assent. (page 30)

His use of hyperbole and, quite frankly, poor grammar, show Army to be the amateur work it is, but it was never meant for wide distribution, and probably played well with its intended audience.  Regardless of literary skill, he can create a sense of drama for the reader:

The journeying is always commenced in the thick of the night, naturally flash lights, reflectors or anything which could attract the even vigilant enemy’s slightest attention are strictly prohibited.

In fact, even minute details such as the observation of time through the light piece in ones wristwatch must be exercise with extreme caution.  One a densely dark night (which Kashmir has many of) this light piece small as it may be, could still be observed from afar by the foe…

Sometimes ones own outstretched hand may not even de discernible due to the intensity of the darkness that envelops the land.  In such cases the Mujahideen whilst moving at night will simply grasp a hold of the clothing of the man who is directly in front of him, such as a flowing shirttail. (page 23)

I can’t help but think that the above passage could have been used to argue for funding the purchase of night vision goggles. 

He uses military-style training images to describe the formations for “launching” possibly as a way of highlighting both the jihadis military preparedness and professionalism and as a lure to young men who may be attracted to the idea of learning military arts – especially in the “cause of Allah.”

And concludes this part of Army by once again placing Mujahideen activity within a sacramental context:

It is of a surety a punishing soul searching experience...Moreover, it is a question of how large the individuals heart is and whether or not it is filled with Dhikr of Allah without whose aid all would be futile, rendering ones effort to no avail. (page 31)

Under a Beautiful Kashmiri Moon, Part III

(Prelude , Part 1, Part 2)

Unrelenting Jihad in the cause of Allah

Army of Madinah in Kashmir was written for two audiences: radicalized young men and potential donors.  Young men and money are the two key resources needed to maintain any jihad, and the most effective means of finding recruits and financial support is to prove that any theater of jihad is a defensive jihad.   Defensive jihad obligates Muslims to provide individual support, what is called fard ‘ayn, or individual duty *.  Al-Hindi achieves this by narrating “facts” about Kashmir, and then highlighting the piety of the Muslim population of Kashmir and the young men involved.  We can see the same rhetoric is used today in the media produced by all global Islamist movements.

Al-Hindi begins the body of Army with a caveat, cautioning the reader that the book is something more than a collection of facts. “This is not a historical essay,” he writes, “Rather it is a truthful, first hand witnessed exposure about the more recent affairs which have been transpiring…” But he has to set the stage for his central narrative, highlighting as he does mujahideen activity within Kashmir.  He does this with a table (reproduced here) – “Kashmir: A Profile at a Glance” -- and few pages of “history.”  The solution to the dispute over Kashmir, he writes, is “An unrelenting Jihad in the Cause of Allah.”  These “facts” provide “proof” that mujahideen activity in Kashmir is a defensive jihad.

However, facts wouldn’t matter if the act isn’t sanctioned by God.  It becomes clear immediately that religion occupies a central place in Al-Hindi’s jihad narrative.

For instance, he uses a quote from the Quran to justify the Kashmiri jihad as a proper defensive jihad:

And what is wrong with you that you fight not in the cause of Allah… (4:75)

From this and numerous other passages throughout Army, the reader quickly realizes that the paramilitary activity Al-Hindi describes is for him a sacramental act, sanctioned by Allah.  “Who knows how many Angels their Lord has deployed,” he writes of the mujahideen, “reinforcing their ranks granting the believers success in their raids and ambushes which otherwise would amount to no avail.”

Religion means something very different here.  It is not just a lifestyle choice in the Western sense.  Rather, Al-Hindi and his audience see it as a complete system of behavior, dictated by Allah.  Everything a man does needs to conform to Allah’s will as it is revealed in Islam’s holy books.  This vision of life is what informs Al-Hindi’s odd, but illuminating footnote to the term “freedom fighter” on Page 17.  He doesn’t like the term, he writes, because it

…is not a correct indication of what the Mujahid fights for.  As per the hadeeth of the Messenger of Allah when he was asked:  “A man fights for nationalism, a man fights for war booty, and a man fights to show off – which of these is in the way of Allah?” and the Messenger replied ‘Whoever fights to make the word of Allah supreme then it is in the way of Allah’”

Al-Hindi is constantly providing proof that Kashmir is a “defensive Jihad using “evidence” wrought with hyperbole that builds an image of innocent Muslim suffering reflected in the Quranic verse quoted at the beginning who are the targets of “the occupying forces [who] have been free to commit every kind of mass atrocity it seems yet to be matched by mankind.” Later in the book, Al-Hindi will describe some of these alleged “atrocities,” and so I will skip the details for now. 

Once he builds the “local” frame to justify Kashmir as a defensive jihad, Al-Hindi moves on to discuss in general terms “freedom fighters,” and their enemy, the Indian army.  India is desperate, he says, “to keep an iron grip on the state has shamefully deployed a full two-fifths of their entire military machine into Kashmir.”  The mujahideen are only “a rag tag force,” that relies on what he calls “a Guerilla Jihad retaliation strategy which surprising as it may seem has been quite successful thus far.  It is continuing, escalating and maturing as time elapses.”

A reader will recognize the narrative from numerous Al Qaeda media, and perhaps see the pattern of paramilitary training and activity that resurfaced in Iraq after the invasion.  Perhaps if the US had studied the Bosnian and Kashmiri jihads a bit more closely we would have been able to anticipate some of the tactics and strategies.  Throughout Army there are moments of reverse déjà vu, where the reader recognizes some terrorist activity used against the Indian army – such as roadside bombs – that would be effectively deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan.

* Bin Laden’s 1996 declaration of war is a perfect example of Al Qaeda leadership using the same arguments.  After highlighting then-current American activity in the Middle East, including UN sanctions against Iraq, he writes:

All these crimes and sins committed by the American are a clear declaration of war on Allah, His Messenger, and the Muslims.  Ulema throughout Islamic history are unanimously agreed that the jihad is an individual duty whenever the enemy tears into the land of the Muslims.

Bin Laden goes on to list a few supporting ulema and then quotes Ibn Tamiyya who he calls the

‘Sheikh of Islam’ [who] in his chronicles, where he states:

‘As for defensive warfare, this is the greatest way to defend sanctity and religion.  This is an obligation consensually agreed to [by the ulema].  After faith, there is nothing more sacred than repulsing the enemy who attacks religion and life.’”

[Source: The Al Qaeda Reader, pp. 12-13]

Under a Beautiful Kashmiri Moon, Part 2

(See Prelude and Part 1)

The Frame

Radical Islam has always been a teaching movement.  The movement’s founder, Hasan al-Banna, was a professional educator, and early designs for his organization, the Muslim Brotherhood, integrate youth education, physical training (“scouting”) and what we would describe as “public service.”  It’s a cradle to grave vision of Muslim community that guarantees a “next generation.”  It’s also a successful model, repeated and modified often among other radical Islamist groups, many of which are off shoots of the Brotherhood, including Al Qaeda.  It’s why the presence of a first generation of radicalized Muslim in a community practically guarantees the presence of a second, and so on.  It’s also why Al Qaeda’s emirs tend to be from the ranks of camp trainers; they should be natural teachers.

“To the new generation,” Al-Hindi writes in the Acknowledgments, “…just remember, the term “Mujahid” does not belong to anyone for keeps; it is only a borrowed one…”

Al Qaeda’s emir club represented a second generation of operational leadership who benefited from the group’s secure and thriving locations in Afghanistan.  Terry McDermott describes this camp complex in his 2005 book, Perfect Soldiers, which at “its high point encompassed more than fifty locations, under the supervision of various national fighting groups…” It was, he writes, “hierarchical. 

The main camps were sorting and marshaling years where dueling jihadist groups competed for recruits…Men graduated from there to other camps, often passing through two, three, or even four locations…”

There they may have benefited from the religious and ideological insights of one of Al Qaeda’s key strategists, Abu Mu’sab al-Suri and other ideologues.  They would have received basic and advanced military training from experienced mujahideen, and they would have networked with men from all over the world. 

A mujahideen’s experience in the camps was often succeeded with experience in a real jihad.  When Al-Hindi attended the camps in the mid-1990s, mujahideen wannabes could chose from several different active regional jihads, including Bosnia and Chechnya.  He chose Kashmir, or perhaps it chose him. 

Al-Hindi was born in India into a Hindu family; his given name is Dhiren.  His parents emigrated to the UK, and according to newspaper accounts, the family was and continues to be, respectable, middle-class Brits.  However, as is so often the case with the profile of Al Qaeda operatives, Al-Hindi’s conversion and steadily developing radicalism comes as a surprise to his family and friends, and was most likely a source of tension.   The book’s publisher acknowledges Al-Hindi’s family tensions.  “What is most unusual about this book,” the Publisher’s Notes says,

“…is the author himself.  It is so rare for people in our age to take on the struggle for the sake of Allah.  So image someone who comes from a non-Muslim background, struggling first against himself, then those around him from friends and family…”

From the very beginning of Army, I was struck by how thoroughly Al-Hindi has erased his Hindu identity.   Throughout the book he describes the Indian Army, and Hindus in general, with pejoratives – heathen, for example -- that would have probably upset many of his family members and former friends. His radicalization is so complete that he no longer recognizes either an Indian or a British identity, and instead identifies entirely with the Kashmiri mujahideen and the movement of “revolutionary Pan-jihadism.” 

The book itself is clearly written for young men who are already radicalized as a way of motivating them to join the jihad.  For instance, Al-Hindi takes for granted that the reader will be familiar with certain of the prophet Mohammed’s sayings without references or citations, such as the books dedication to “the thousands of Shuhadaa who fell under the Kashmiri moon…they will be placed in the hearts of green birds, roaming therein as they please.”  “Hearts of green birds,” is reference to a popular hadith (saying of Mohammed) among radical Islamists and jihadists, and has been the inspiration for numerous pro-jihadist works, including a (c. late 90s) audio production dedicated to muj who were killed in Bosnia. 

A second possible audience may have been local businessmen and community leaders who could finance recruitment and overseas training programs, and his own operations, but I will leave that discussion for later. 

In the role of teacher, Al-Hindi is thinking of the new generation that he hopes will be inspired by his work.  Like a lot of what I read within the Salafist and Jihadist traditions, Al-Hindi makes no distinction between jihad now and the jihad of “centuries old and past.”   He goes on (using somewhat poetic language):

They have all fatefully found their places in one of the abundant seas that are the martyr cemeteries that sprout forth in this beautiful land as profusely as do the fields of rice.

In the role of teacher he is careful to “frame” the Kashmir jihad as a defensive jihad against a occupying force, in this case the Indian army.  The frame consists of a-historical “facts,” (Indian “invasion” of Pakistan in 1947, etc), and a litany of exaggerated anecdotal examples of Muslim “sufferings.”  The “mujahideen” are always shown to be pure-hearted and poorly-funded “davids” fighting whatever brutal goliath is the target of the jihad. 

It was a popular frame during the Soviet-Afghan war. It was effective during the 90s-era jihads (see Evan Kohlmann’s report, “The Afghan-Bosnian Mujahideen Network in Europe” for more on the vast radical Islamist recruitment and fundraising network active in Europe in the 1990s) in Chechnya and Bosnia.  And it is used with brutal effectiveness in practically every major Al Qaeda video produced and distributed today over the Internet.  If Al-Hindi was writing in 2007 rather than 1999, he would have been creating a movie script and working with a director and editor.  Instead he quotes Khalil Gibran’s The Garden of the Prophet, “Pity the nation…”

The frame serves another purpose; it justifies the righteousness of the Kashmiri jihad.  Without a sound justification for the jihad, it would be difficult to raise money and find recruits.  The goal of the frame appears to be to prove that Kashmir is a defensive jihad rather than an offensive jihad, because it is easier to prove the righteousness of a defensive jihad, especially to young men raised in Western cultures that generally eschew any form of offensive war. 

I’m certainly not the only one who has noticed this rhetorical frame.  Even as I typed this today a TOC alert arrived in my in-box for the new issue of Studies in Conflict & Terrorism that includes a new article by Johnny Ryan of the Institute of International and European Affairs.  The article’s title “The Four P-Words of Militant Islamist Radicalization and Recruitment: Persecution, Precedent, Piety, and Perseverance” and abstract discuss this very phenomenon.  The rhetorical frame is also discussed in a wonderful RadioFreeEurope/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) study of  jihadi media in post-invasion Iraq. 

To complete the frame Al-Hindi reinforces the divine nature of defensive jihad by quoting from the Quran (4:75)

An what is wrong with you that you fight not in the Cause of Allah…

Then he gets down to business.

Under a Beautiful Kashmiri Moon, Part I

The words of an emir

Born Dhiren Barot, Issa Al-Hindi is believed to have been Al Qaeda's emir, or prince, in the UK.  As an emir, Al-Hindi would have been responsible for recruiting, training, raising funds, and planning attacks.  He would have needed excellent networking skills within the local Muslim community, and extensive physical, religious and ideological training .  He also must have had the charisma and personality needed to solicit funds from respected individuals in the community, and a bottomless well of patience in order to plot, recruit, train and execute attacks-1.  And he’ll need to do all this while constantly on the move in order to maintain operational security.

As an Al Qaeda emir, Al-Hindi was part of an exclusive club of multi-lingual, globe-trotting, educated men who trained or were trained in Al Qaeda’s 90s-era Afghan complex, fought in one of the era’s myriad of regional jihads, and earned the trust of Al Qaeda’s senior operational leadership.  The other club members who make up this second generation of Al Qaeda leadership include Indonesian Riduan Isomuddin, aka Hambali (in custody), the Saudi, Yusuf al-Ayyeri (d. 2003), and later on, Ahmed Khalayleh (d. 2006), the Jordanian better known as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. 

Al-Hindi is a thinker, a trait he shares with other club members including Yusuf al-Ayyeri, whose own works are popular with today’s global jihadis.   In Army Al-Hindi is always thinking past the current moment.  He’s always attempting to contextualize his activity and the events linked to what he calls “revolutionary Pan-jihadism.”  And so his insights provide a window into the global jihad movement – its goals, strategies, values, etc -- as it was just before 9-11, and still is to some extent.  Al Qaeda leadership continues to draw from Al-Hindi’s generation’s “deep bench” with men like Mohammed Hassan, aka Abu Yahya al-Libbi. They will probably do so until the bench is cleared through attrition. However, by that point, a new, third generation, will have emerged.

The next generation, like the young men being trained by Al-Libbi in these pictures, will define the next phase of the movement, drawing from their own experiences and what they learn from the words of men like Issa al-Hindi.

1 -- A good example comes from Abu Mu’sab al-Zarqawi (before he was an emir).  In 2001-02, German authorities intercepted phone calls he made to his active al-Tawhid cell in Germany while he was himself fleeing the fall of the Taliban, traveling through Iran into Iraq.  According to one London Times report,

A surprising picture of one of the world’s most wanted terrorists emerged from the trial. Al-Zarqawi came across as a leader sensitive to the foibles of his men, able to mask his irritation with his incompetent followers.

When one of the group lost the photographs for a passport forged in Iran, al-Zarqawi merely said: “It is the will of Allah.” He settled many squabbles within the group and eased nerves. Even when he urged them to speed up their planning for a bomb attack, he did so gently: “Listen, listen, the longer the matter takes, the worse it is for you. Try to shorten this process of waiting and trust in Allah.” The members of the cell, talking among themselves, called him Habib — “dearest” or “darling”.

Note: Minor edits on 10-2-07

Under a Beautiful Kashmiri Moon: Prelude

I’m in the middle of my first detailed post on Issa al-Hindi’s The Army of Madinah in Kashmir, but I wanted to point out to you, my (few) readers, a surprising passage in the book.  I read it yesterday for the first time, and in it Al- Hindi may have expressed at least part of Al Qaeda’s operational strategy, specifically the targeting of Western economies.

The passage occurs toward the end of the book when Al-Hindi attempts to put the Kashmiri jihad into a greater context, specifically in exploring the problem of how to make a successful jihad “stick.”  “The attentive reader,” he writes, “should carefully ponder and reflect long term.”  That is, beyond fighting, when successful mujahideen have “hoist[ed] the flag of Islam to the loftiest position.”

No doubt, he says, there will be intervention from outside states.  Thus, “certain crucial set backs must be well prepared for.”  He gives as an example, “foreign ‘peace keepers’ [will] undoubtedly intervene, as France did in Algeria and as more recently America has begun to do with their ‘terrorist’ missile attacks (stylishly termed as surgical strikes) in Afghanistan.”  This last one is a reference to the 1998 US missile strikes on Al Qaeda training camps.  He also uses as an example NATO‘s then recent activity in Eastern Europe, probably referring to NATO action in Bosnia.

He calls this preparation “Flank Protection:”

In the face of such an adversary the solution may only be ‘Flank Protection’ to be carried out upon the sol of all interfering nations.  The indigenous Believers that reside in thee meddling countries however can only do this.  For it is they, the locals, and not foreigners who understand the language, culture, area and common practices of the enemy whom they coexist amongst.

In effect to create a big enough problem on their home front, one that is destabilizing enough to force them to sway their glances away from the Eastern Muslim world.  For this, it would seem that the most favourable target would be the national economy of the western block.

Verse of the Sword follows [Sura 9:5] [Note: Al-Hindi actually cites the verse as 8:5]

Then when the Sacred Months have passed, then kill the Mushrikun wherever you find them, and capture them and beseige them, and lie in wait for them in every stratagem of war.  But if they repent and perform As-Salat, and give Zakat, then leave their way free.  Verily, Allah is Oft-Forgiving, Most Merciful.

Great stealth (Tuqiyah) is required.  To attempt to bring any one of these interfering nations to it’s [sic] knees is a major task which undoubtedly takes a great deal of carefully coerced interaction.  At the same time do not be disheartened by those who would dare to brand you as terrorists for perhaps you may even be pro active only as a show of power, minus civilian casualties.

Whatever one does, it should be synchronised with other activities for more effective results.  However, a world of warning…projects should be carried out professionally and ideally on a frequent basis, or possibly not at all, for depending on action taken, sometimes resulting factors can be more negative than positive.

(Pages 116-117)

Issa al-Hindi was Al Qaeda’s emir in the United Kingdom, recruiting and raising money for Al Qaeda, and plotting spectacular attacks in the UK and the United States. Al-Hindi cased banking targets in the United States, and authored recon reports on the intended targets.  Those reports, initially discovered on the computer of Mohammed Naeem Noor Khan in Pakistan, generated the big scare in August 2004. Subsequent recon videos uncovered in British raids solidified suspicions of a dramatic plot in the making for the United States.

I read Al-Hindi’s reports in full.  They are literate, and clearly “professional.”  There is no doubt in my mind that he received formal recon training from someone who worked (at some point in his career) in a national army or intel agency.  British authorities released heavily redacted versions of the reports and edited versions of his casing videos (examples here and here) soon after Al-Hindi plead guilty to terrorism charges.

 

The Army of Madinah in Kashmir is dated 1999, and was probably written in the previous year or two.  That places Al-Hindi’s  “Flank Protection” theory of developing “indigenous” cells inside “meddling countries” clearly in Al Qaeda’s pre-9-11 strategy.  Senior AQ leaders like Khalid Sheik Mohammed were likely aware of Al-Hindi’s ideas, and indeed, Al-Hindi may just be parroting strategic and ideological training he received in Pakistan or Afghanistan.  How much of it is his, I’ll leave to his interrogators, who no doubt have read his book in detail.

However, this passage shows that Al Qaeda’s long range planning included building cells inside key countries like the United States. Al Qaeda’s success in creating “indigenous” cells remains unclear.