Making Sense of Jihad

The Brotherhood's Bi-Annual Review

I tweeted this last week, but I forgot to post it to the blog.  Consider it a curio from a different time. It's an English-language periodical, published in 1990 through a Cairo-based Muslim Brotherhood publishing house - Ummah Press Service.  The Library of Congress record is here.

There are no bombshells in this document, but if you're an observer of the Egyptian Brotherhood - and you're reading about this for the first time - you may find this artifact something of interest.  It, along with other English language Ummah Press Service publications, suggest that the editors had a Western audience in mind.  It begs the question: whose ambition was it to reach an English-reading audience, and for what purpose?

Back in 2007, I posted on another Ummah Press Service publication, The West in the Eyes of the Egyptian Islamic Movement.  That document (a copy of my original file can found here) was a discussion of the political distinctions and means of action between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian jihadi groups of the period, Jihad and Islamic Group.

The periodical linked here was part of an ambitious experiment to construct an English-language identity for the group.  The experiment failed.  There's little in the LC records to show that Ummah Press regularly produced English language material after the early 1990s.  Perhaps this is what makes the Biannual Review so interesting. So little English-language scholarship about the Brotherhood exists from this time period.  Of the 19 records drawn from the LC catalog, only one is in English.  As a result, this tiny collection of English-language works, published in earnest by the Muslim Brotherhood in the early 1990s, may be the only extant English-language primary source material of the period available for further scholarly study of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.

No Fan of the Ban

I am no fan of the recent Swiss vote to ban minarets.  It's jarring to know that a policy of hindering religious expression would be debated and voted on constitutional grounds in a Western country.  It also reminds me once again of the blessings of the US constitution's prohibition on government meddling in religion.  However, the issue is much more complex than some of the left- right commentaries I've read over the past week.  Iman Kurdi was brutally honest in Arab News: 

The French are considering a law to ban the wearing of the burqa in France and yet only a tiny minority of French Muslim women wear it. The Swiss have voted an amendment to change their constitution to ban the building of minarets and yet there are only a total of four minarets in the country.

This leads to at least two conclusions. First, it is the visibility of Islam that is at issue. A woman wearing a burqa stands out. She is immediately recognizable as Muslim. Similarly a minaret puts a Muslim stamp on the landscape. It states that in this land Muslims exist side by side with the Christian majority, that they are now part of the country’s cultural identity.

Partly this is a legacy of secularism. There is distaste not so much for Islam as for the idea of religion being visible and public.

Essentially the message sent by Swiss voters and now repeated across Europe is one that could be summed up by a French proverb: “To live well, live hidden”. In other words, you can practice your religion, but only privately and discreetly. Moreover, there is the idea that Muslims who choose to live in a European country should adopt the ways of the land. The onus is on them to adopt the local culture and the fear is that the opposite will happen.

If you're asking why a Western country would vote like this, I'll give you a blunt answer: it's the secularism, stupid.  As Kurdi notes above, it is the visibility of Islam that makes it so imposing in societies that have rejected any role for religion in the public square.  To borrow a common American phrase, I would say that some Muslim immigrants have seen Europe's "naked public square" and are attempting to wrap it in a hijab.

Despite long-standing efforts to remake the US in the image of European secularism, America still has the "soul of a church."  That matters.  In the US religious dialog is ongoing, and generally free of government meddling (although that is changing).  As a result, a mosque becomes just one religious house among many competing for souls, and a surprisingly ineffective one (but that's a topic for a later post).  For more discussion see this July post from my fellow CI blogger Eric Randolph.

Here's a local example: if you drive down Route 7 in Northern Virginia, you will certainly notice the presence of Islam (and radical Islam). However, you will also see vibrant South American Catholic and emerging Protestant "eglise" communities. An hijab store sits next door to the small Romanian Orthodox Church. Not far from the Saudi-funded Dar al-Hijrah mosque is St Anthony of Padua Roman Catholic Church, which probably serves a larger congregation than the mosque. There's also an Orthodox church, a Chinese Protestant church, and a Disciples of Christ church along the same stretch of road.

The mosque on New Hampshire Avenue  in Silver Spring, MD, once attended by Nidal Hasan, is neighbor to a Vietnamese Roman Catholic Church, numerous mainline and evangelical protestant churches, many catering to Korean and Spanish immigrants. I'm working from memory here, but I even think there are Buddhist and Hindu temples along the same stretch of road.  When you drive along  New Hampshire Avenue, you are glimpsing a cross-section of suburban immigrant America, and Islam is just one layer among many.

Rather than criticize the Swiss people, I prefer to reflect on the seemingly bottomless chasm between average Europeans and their governing elite.  When the folks "at the top" are genuinely surprised by the outcome of a public referendum that won by a broad and significant margin, one has to wonder whether that governing elite is really qualified to govern. 

On a related note, I find it interesting that Sheikh Qaradhawi hasn't worked his global congregation up into the frenzy like he did after the "Cartoon" controversy in 2006.  I can't precisely pin-point motivations here.  Part of this could be the fact that the supposed insult was simply insignificant compared to the cartoons.  But I also have a hunch that it may have something to do with ongoing dawah efforts in the West.   After decades of projecting an image of Islam as a religion of reason into a mostly secular Europe, the cartoon frenzy pretty much destroyed that image, and set back dawah efforts in Europe.  As a matter of fact, I'd guess that the cartoon frenzy may have played a significant role in motivating many average Swiss to vote to ban a public symbol of Islam. 

Countering Conventional Wisdom

International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence's new report challenges the conventional wisdom on internet radicalization. 

Tim has full coverage of its release.

This CNet article gives you an idea of the report's primary thesis:

That's not to say that extremists don't ever use Web sites to reinforce their messages but that "self-radicalization and self-recruitment via the Internet with little or no relation to the outside world rarely happens, and there is no reason to suppose that this situation will change in the near future."

It also found that "much of the jihadist Web presence was about 'preaching to the choir'" and that "it is largely ineffective when it comes to drawing in new recruits."

After examining a variety of ways to block, filter, or remove offensive sites, the report found that "many of the filtering technologies that are currently in use are either too crude or too expensive to operate" and that they fail to deal with the conversational part of the Internet." Even though it may be possible to "remove, filter or hide content that is available from relatively static Web sites," such efforts will be largely ineffective when it comes to "chat rooms, instant messaging, virtual worlds and networking sites." Like the rest of us, it seems as if terrorists have discovered Web 2.0.

Danish Dawah

I found this little gem tonight. 

http://www.scribd.com/doc/11427523/islam-for-born-denmark

It's a 1969 Danish-language pamphlet published by the I.I.F.S.O with a forward by Afzal Rahman (from London).  It appears to have been distributed by a group called the Scandinavian Foundation of Islamic Services. Not jihad related, but certainly a curio from the Brotherhood's still-formative years in Europe.

Is this necessary?

Do the Saudis really define Islam?

A Teaching Moment

To prove my assertion that al-Qaida sees itself as a dawah organization I'm going to bet (a blog post) that they produce a video (probably with Dr. Z) associating the current financial crisis with punishment from God, and calling on American's to convert.  It'll take about a week before the bouncy .gif shows up on whatever forums are available.

Around the Web (German edition)

My things-to-blog-on list that had accumulated while I was away.  Tonight is the night to clear it out.  With a glass of riesling kabinett within arms length and a Met opera rebroadcast of an 08 performance of Die Walkure blaring in the background, I can't imagine a more blissful setting to blog in. 

Is Dr. Z dead?  I guess we'll find out soon enough.  Such a target would not remain secret for more than, oh, 20 minutes.

But then there were two.  We may not know about Dr. Z, but we do know that another member of the Bagram Four has joined the choir invisible.  Bill Roggio at The Long War Journal notes,

Abu Abdallah al Shami, one of four senior al Qaeda operatives who escaped from Bagram prison on July 10, 2005, was killed in an unspecified airstrike, said Mustafa Abu Yazid, al Qaeda's senior commander in Afghanistan.... Shami, who is also called Abu Mu'adh, is originally from Syria. He was captured by US forces Afghanistan's Khost province in 2003. He then spent "about a year and eleven months" in Bagram prison, according to al Qaeda Spokesman Abu Yahya al Libi, al Qaeda's spokesman who also escaped Bagram along with Shami and two other senior operatives.

Siegmund just pulled the sword out of the tree!  Ah!  Act One comes to an end.

Andrew Cochran reports on a new study on the growing need for an "integrated national asymmeric threat strategy," co-authored by beltway bandit CACI International.  (Counterterrorism Blog)

Over at the Investigative Project, Jeffrey Imm  responds to a local Detroit newspaper's criticism of the successful Hoekstra amendment,

Confusion as to the "nature and character" of the enemy is precisely the goal of groups that support Islamist doctrine. Not surprisingly, Islamist groups and their apologists quickly attacked the Hoekstra amendment approval by the House of Representatives.

Insurgency Research Group has a remarkable and honest post exploring British failures in southern Iraq and Afghanistan.

IRG blog also summarizes Thomas Hegghammer's remarkable essay on Al Qaida's Arabian branch.   I have long-studied AQs activities on the Peninsula, because the stability of the region counts for so much when you study the reliability of global petroleum supplies.  Studying AQs presence in Saudi Arabia is hardly "an academic issue," as Hegghammer so ably argues.  After all,

we do not really understand what determines the comings and goings of Islamist violence in Saudi Arabia. This is hardly a purely academic issue—it directly concerns our ability to assess the stability of the world’s leading oil producer and a pillar of US strategy in the Middle East.

For a little historical perspective on the last big energy crisis, conservative media site, Hotair recently posted a link to then-president Jimmy Carter's "Wear a Sweater, Stupid" speech of 1977.  I'm old enough to remember the "even-odd" rationing of the 1970s, and remain concerned with the economic consequences of a "bad day" in Saudi Arabia.  The long term effects of such a day could make the 70s look good.

Fricka is now making her case.  Let's see:  the opera started at 8 PM.  It's almost 10 PM and Act 2 began about 10 minutes ago.

There's some international CT efforts underway off the coast of Somalia, a region that continues to suffer from pirate activity, according to a July 31 article at Expatica.

It's been making the rounds among the seriously good CT and COIN blogs, and it's worth noting here: Ghosts of Alexander's, "The Afghanistan Analyst Bibliography. 3rd edition."

The Combating Terrorism Center analyzing new data from the Sinjar records, that super stash of jihadi bio data uncovered in Iraq.  According to the report summary of Bombers, Bank Accounts, and Bleedout, including:

Statistics on the exact number and nationality of foreign fighters held by the US at Camp Bucca in Iraq.
Contracts signed by AQI's foreign suicide bombers.
Contracts signed by AQI fighters entering and leaving Iraq.
Accounting sheets signed by various fighters that indicate funding sources and expenditures.
Several narratives describing AQI's network in Syria, personnel problems, and ties to Fatah al-Islam in Lebanon

Will at Jihadica recently posted on a new resource called COMOPS Monitor, already added to my Reliable Sources list on the right.  He also offers an excellent summary of a recent Washington Post article on the decline of AQ in Iraq.

Meanwhile, The Pest's own post on "Salafi Jihadee Da'wah" in Gaza is a primary source curiosity, http://revolution.muslimpad.com/2008/08/01/the-salafi-jihaadee-dawah-is-underway-in-palestine/ 

"It looked good at first," Walid Phares writes of the recently celebrated Deobandi (India) fatwa against terrorism.  But alas, everything is not as it first appears.  It never is.

Matt at Mountain Runner looks at the Taliban's strengths in asymmetric warfare, what he calls "holistic warfare that includes what our doctrine still sees as unconventional and yet is the dominant form of warfare today and into the future (irrespective of whether the F-22 should be kept)."

On a related note, a post at icommons.org explores AQs success at applying "open source models" of communication.

State Department's unhealthy obsession with radical front groups in the US was the topic of a recent congressional hearing, reported at IPT.

If you heard about the recent Madrid conference on inter-religious dialog, but got nearly no insight from the mainstream -- aka "godless" -- press, St Francis Magazine's blog links to some relevant and substantive articles on Madrid and the role of the Saudi king in all this.

It's 20 minutes to 11 PM.  Brunhilde sounds like she needs a lozenge.  James Morris sings the role of Wotan like it's a natural extension of his own personality.  Still, an hour into Act 2, it sound like he just wants Fricka to shut up and make him a sandwich.

Browsetopics.gov -- an ongoing, excellent librarian-generated taxonomy of government information -- recently collected links to various Department of Energy's tech, research and gray literature databases.

As I type this, I'm checking my RSS feed reader, and sure enough, reports of Dr. Z's death may be exaggerated, according to Bill Roggio.

11 PM.  Siegmund and Hunding are not dead yet, but this post has come to an end....until next time.

 

It’s the “Radical Dawa,” Stupid

Back in October 2007 the Dutch General intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) produced a remarkable study of radical Islam.  Its English title is "The Radical Dawa in Transition: The Rise of Islamic Neoradicalism in the Netherlands," and is a a profile of the history, scope, character and (possible) future of radical Islam within the country.   Although the obvious attention is on the Netherlands, the report is a window into the primary mechanism for the establishment and prosperity of what it names as “Islamic neoradicalism." 

The report's insights can be applied in practically every Western country with a sizable Muslim community, and thankfully so. It is possibly the most accurate description of how radical Islam works – how it manifests itself – inside Western society.  First, it describes the core mechanism for radicalization:  dawa, or proselytizing.  It’s an uncomfortable truth that many secular analysts and policymakers here just don’t want to tackle.  From the perspective of dawa, or more specifically radical dawa, the authors trace the establishment, history, current and future of “neoradicalism” in Netherlands. 

Its authors use the precise term of Salafist-Jihadist, taking pains to distinguish currents within Salafist movement such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Hizb-ut-Tahrir.   The English version also reads as a dispassionate and brutally honest account of the current state of the “neoradical” movement in the context of similar active Islamic movements, and in the context of the wider Western and secular society.

Noting the report’s characterization and assessment of the threat posed by neoradical movements, Matthew Levitt posted on the English version of the report back on January 16th, writing that it

warns against "absolutist views" of Islamic radicalism, arguing it is wrong to portray the non-violent activities of such groups as either a passing, benign phase on the one hand or an immediate security threat on the other.

A Little on the Wright

I haven't read through Lawrence Wright's new article yet, but having been alerted to it via Jihadica, I feel obliged to post some insight on as much as I have read.  For the record, I loved Wright's The Looming Tower, but understood that it was about as close to page-turning fiction as I was willing to come, even during the summer lounging by the pool.  I come to this article with the same expectations.

Wright doesn't disappoint.  His characterizations of Zawahiri and Fadl remind me of the personality clashes you read about in rock bands:

Fadl resented the attention that Zawahiri received. (In the interview with Al Hayat, Fadl said that Zawahiri was “enamored of the media and a showoff.”) And yet he let Zawahiri take the public role and give voice to ideas and doctrines that came from his own mind, not Zawahiri’s. This dynamic eventually became the source of an acrimonious dispute between the two men.

The question I have then is which one is Paul and which one is John? 

Seriously, though, I'm not as entirely convinced as Peter Wehner at Contentions that Dr. Fadl's recent book is a sign that "the tide within the Islamic world is turning against jihadism."  For one thing, there has never been much of a tide for "jihadism."  Al Qaida's never been overflowing with sympathizers and recruits.  Rather it markets itself as a small, out-numbered "vanguard." 

The other thing to keep in mind is that the Salafist-Jihadist current predates Al Qaida by decades, and has survived astonishing violence and chaos.  Dr. Fadl's ideas may now counter Al Qaida's ideas, he may even strip Al Qaida of some of its moral authority, but Salafist-Jihadism survives intact. 

These men live to think and talk.  Fadl's book may have been a blow to Zawahiri, but he's survived these before. Does anyone recall the reactions to his group's terrorist attacks in Egypt in the 1990s?  Rather it being a death blow, it probably inspired Dr. Z to more ideas.  It opened doors to insights into new arguments, etc.  Rather then be Al Qaida's end, it may act to reinvigorate the movement, keeping the legitimacy of the idea of violent jihad relevant for a new generation.

Ideas generally don't die.  They just evolve.  Case in point: Marxism.  Everyone thought it died when the Berlin Wall came crumbling down. But in 2000, and again in 2004, the entire movement was reinvigorated by Hardt/Negri's books Empire and Multitude.  Their ideas of localized "resistance" show up everywhere, and will be on full display during this year's US presidential race.

Again, I haven't read the entire article, and so I'll come back to these and other ideas once I feel more comfortable with Wright's entire piece. 

Dependency

Daveed Gartenstein-Ross’s new policy brief for the Foundation for Defense of Democracies summarizes some of the strategic consequences of our current dependence on foreign oil.  His arguments aren't  new, they have just taken on new resonance as the price of gasoline has put oil on everyone's brain these days.  The argument against further dependence on foreign oil are in summary that,

• petrodollars support terrorism
• it increases supply vulnerability to terrorism
• the cost of crude is negatively affecting our overall economic stability and food prices

I mostly agree with him, but the purpose of this post is to point out that the arguments and solutions that Gartenstein-Ross offer are more complex than at first glance.  A closer look at two of the common arguments in the FDD report will, I hope, be an informal introduction to a very complex dynamic at work.  This post doesn't represent a formal analytical piece, rather it is a synthesis of a few ideas rattling around in my head after reading the FDD brief.

You won’t find me disagreeing with Gartenstein-Ross’ first argument that our dependence on foreign oil causes us to “fund both sides of the terror war.”  Money pouring into Persian Gulf countries is finding its way into the hands of terrorist groups, and more important, global radicalization efforts operating under the false cover of  “dawah.”  The rise of Islamic banking -- and the impenetrable, exclusive culture of Islamic scholars who run it -- poses its own threat, one that we are woefully unprepared to handle.  I dedicate a great deal of content on this blog to awareness of the petrodollar power emerging from the Gulf.  It’s one of the reason why I believe that regardless of Al Qaeda’s losses in Iraq, time is on their side.  The GCC recently reported that member countries were expecting a 12 trillion dollar cash surplus over the next five years.  Even if a mere.001 percent of that cash reaches Al Qaeda, that’s 12 billion dollars.  That’s a lot of jihad.

Please read my new article in the Combating Terrorism Center’s Sentinel journal for my opinion on Al Qaeda’s threat to energy infrastructure in the Gulf.  Gartenstein-Ross and I agree on this count, as well.

The core problem here isn’t that we’re sending our money into the Gulf.  It’s that Gulf beneficiaries are using their new-found wealth to remake Islam in their own image, and we have no strategy for combating these dawah efforts. 

Besides, it wouldn’t cease, even if we could end our dependence on Saudi and Iraqi crude tomorrow.  There would be other countries willing to take up the slack, especially China.  In other words, Saudi Arabia would not be hard pressed to find another client.  As a matter of fact, Gulf countries may be already exploiting China’s dependence on their oil, by convincing the Chinese government to permit members of their Muslim community to train at Gulf madrasas.  Readers of this blog are informed enough to understand the possible long-term implications of Wahhabist training and dawah.

Also, if we were to pull our oil interests from the Gulf tomorrow, it would alter our geopolitical standing in the region.  We would no longer be a strategic player in a significant region of the world.  Far from retreating from the Gulf, I believe we should be meddling more:  more diplomats, more soldiers, more military bases, more corporations, more tourists.  12 trillion surplus dollars converts to substantial global geopolitical power for countries that are no bigger than the state of Rhode Island.  Instead of whining, we should be asserting our geopolitical muscle when it is needed.

Another argument often heard is the call for fuel alternatives.  In very real terms alternative energy sources are still decades -- decades -- away.  Are they worth pursuing?  Yes.  Will any provide an alternative to current energy prices?  Absolutely not. 

Case in point: the number of long haul trucks on the road is an important indicator of economic growth.  More buying going on here in the States, means the more goods being manufactured overseas.  When those new goods reach our shores at points like the port of Los Angeles, those products have to make it to the Wal-Mart or supermarket shelves, and more often than not they are getting their by truck.  When there is an alternative fuel that can fuel an 18-wheeler from LA to Maine, then we have finally found an alternative source of energy.  The same goes for planes.  The alternative fuel we’re all looking for to solve our current problems just doesn’t exist. 

For the record, I would love to see the end of our oil-based economy, but only if the alternative is clean and reliable and could fuel economic growth.  The fact is we’re as close to an oil-free economy as we are to a paper-free bathroom.  Yet that doesn’t mean our policy should be to have our public leaders gripe about the rising prices, and sit helplessly by while unstable countries play games with or lose total control over their crude supplies. 

For example: Nigeria is a mess.  How bad could it be for one of our top suppliers?  Shell, the biggest company in country, has been in a near constant state of force majeure since the beginning of the year.  That means they have been unable to meet their contracts due to circumstances way out of their control.  Well, the entire country is spiraling out of control.  Are we doing anything to support security and stability in Nigeria?  Do we even have a Nigeria policy?

Cue the crickets chirping.

It’s not enough to say we need to end our “dependence” on foreign oil and find alternative fuels.  Neither idea is realistic.  Rather, we should be turning this volatile market into a strategic advantage.  We’re not the only country hurting under the rising costs of crude, but we are the United States, the most productive country on earth, and the world’s only superpower.  Countries all over the world have a stake in American economic stability, and we have a stake in seeing that oil markets work to our advantage.

NPR's Coverage of Zawahiri's Dawah

NPR recently reported on part I of  Zawahiri's Q & A.  Brian Fishman of West Point's Combatting Terrorism Center does great work placing Dr. Z's answers into context for the general listener.

A Mosque Grows in Geneva

Online jihadis can get SO energetic about their dawah that they will post practically anything they think will help the cause.  I must thank the nice fellow who posted a comprehensive collection of newsletters of a mosque in Geneva, Switzerland, specifically the Centre Islamique de Geneve.  The collection spans about 15 years. Abu al-Dude was even nice enough to zip up the archive for easy download.  Thanks, al-Dude. 

How can I tell this is a mosque run by members of the Muslim Brotherhood?  Beyond the obsession with the Islamic state, the thing that clued me in that they lean toward the Ihkwan were the reproductions of essays by Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood.  His militancy does not necessarily attract the hippie-dippie Sufis, and certainly wouldn't be the first choice for the front page of a Shia newsletter.  No, only a particular kind of Salafist seeks solace and insight from al-Banna:  a radical Islamist.  Oh wait, we're calling these guys moderates these days, aren't we?  I forget.

Well, without further ado, I'm offering up a lesson in obsession (excerpted and in French):

Les formes et les functions de l'État islamique

L'injonction coranique qui déclare : «Obéis à Dieu et obéis au Prophète et à ceux qui, parmi vous, détiennent l'autorité» implique que l'autorité du gouvernement doit être tirée du Livre révélé, le Coran, et complétée par les enseignements du Prophète et qu'elle doit être détenue par un membre de la communauté musulmane. Autrement dit, seul un Musulman peut être le chef de l'Etat. Cette stipulation est exigée par le caractère idéologique de l'Etat islamique ; mais cela ne signifie aucunement que les minorités non musulmanes doivent être reléguées dans le statut des citoyens de seconde classe. A l'exception de la dignité de chef de l'Etat, tous les chemins de la vie politique et sociale leur sont ouverts dans la meme mesure qu'aux citoyens musulmans ; ils doivent jouir des mêmes privilèges et de la meme protection de leurs intérêts sociaux, religieux et culturels ; et ils doivent avoir accès en proportion de leur nombre à la vie politique de leur pays.

<SNIP>

Qu'est-ce que la «théocratie» ?
«Tout ceci est très séduisant» pourrait dire un Occidental, «mais cet effort pour établir un Etat islamique ne conduit-il pas à la théocratie ?» A entendre cette question, je ressens l'inquiétude qu'elle renferme - inquiétude liée aux souvenirs d'une certaine période du passé moyenâgeux de l'Europe.

Ma réponse à cette question supposée est la suivante : oui et non. Oui - si le concept de théocratie sous-entend une forme de société dans  laquelle toute législation, même celle qui est liée au temps, ressortirait en dernière analyse d'un principe religieux - en l'occurrence, de l'autorité du Coran, autorité indiscutable pour tout Musulman croyant. D'un autre côté, la réponse est un «non» formel si la question implique une comparaison entre la théocratie islamique et la règle de l'Eglise dans l'Europe du Moyen-Âge : car, il n'y a dans l' Islam aucune institution semblable à l'Eglise du  monde chrétien. Dans une communauté comme celle de l'Islam où chaque adulte a le droit de remplir n'importe quelle fonction religieuse, il n'y a ni la place ni le besoin du ministère du prêtre ou d'un clergé ; ainsi n'y a-t-il pas non plus le danger de voir le pouvoir politique passer dans les mains d'une hiérarchie religieuse.

Ainsi la méfiance, si répandue parmi les Occidentaux, envers la théocratie n'est-elle pas justifiée quand elle s'applique au problème de l'Islam. Les nombreux Musulmans qui luttent aujourd'hui pour l'idéal d'un Etat islamique ne veulent ni plus ni moins qu'une organization politique qui leur permette d'exprimer leur foi en Dieu, non seulement à la mosquée mais également dans leurs occupations sociales et pratiques. Je ne pense pas que cette idée devrait choquer particulièrement le monde occidental qui est aujourd'hui profondément conscient de la nécessité d'opposer à la force agressive d'un matérialisme inhumain la force d'une foi spirituelle ; je pense au contraire que tout Chrétien qui prend au sérieux sa religion devrait se réjouir des efforts faits par une communauté religieuse - communauté dont les principes moraux sont similaires aux siens – pour établir une société et un état sur la base de sa foi en Dieu.

By the way, I will make this archive available to anyone who I know and like.

Zawahiri the Dawahist

He's back.  "Part II" of Ayman al-Zawahiri's Q&A was released earlier today (the Clearinghouse has a link).  There's no English transcript yet.  However, the Combating Terrorism Center has just posted their analysis of "Part I" of Zawahiri's Q&A.  It will give you a good idea of the content of the original.

Zawahiri has been in "teaching" mode for quite some time, and the Q&A style of this and his last As-Sahab product only continues this pattern.  I'm not sure what motivated him to take on this role, but he obviously saw a need to publicly defend and develop Al Qaeda's teaching on a whole range of topics.  This is perhaps the best way to maintain the immediacy and relevance of their movement.

The Q & A or dialog was a common form of philosophical and religious discourse in classical times. Early Christian apologists used it when countering pagan criticism, and it was "resurrected" during the Muslim conquest of eastern Christendom. Muslim apologists and dawahist borrowed it from their Christian antagonists, and it is still a common rhetorical tool used in dawah.  Zawahiri's "interview" videos are just Q&A dialogs in another format. 

I would caution Western analysts from reading too much into this.  A life lead at the margins (ie. liminal) is one that is often seen as a struggle that you are always losing, a "long defeat."  In that sense, as long as Zawahiri is alive he's going to lament that few true Muslims support the mujahideen's efforts (you can read the same laments in Azzam's work). He's going to challenge the positions of mainstream scholars like Qaradawi (Qutb did the same thing for the scholars of his time).  And he's going to call young men to join his jihad by lamenting how few do so (this is a common refrain in practically every work of Salafist-jihadist apologetics). 

Instead, it's probably best to see Zawahiri's new audio as yet another opportunity for him to teach.  This is long-term strategic work.  Zawahiri is building the ideological foundations for a new generation (or "house," a common use of the word in the Middle Ages) and every question thrown out at him gives him a new section of the house to build.

UPDATE:  Come to think of it, looking at the bouncy .gif announcement, it's absolutely clear now that Dr. Z intends to "teach" his dawah with this Q&A.  It's all in his hand gesture, so common among the dawah images seen in practically every "current" of the Salafist movement.

UPDATE 2:  Click on the image to see it bounce.

Online Jihad Continues Its Move West

The Terrorism Informatics Project and a recent MEMRI post both discuss the emergence of Western language jihadi media forums, off-shoots of stalwart , Arabic-language Al-Ehklass.

The French forum filled with news about France, but also included a translation into French of a recent speech from Ayman al-Zawahiri and translated news from the Iraqi Jihad. The Italian forum contained posts on the Vatican and B1ackwater’s operations in Iraq. As with al-Ekhlaas’s other forums, its foreign language forums require a password and user name to access

We can add the currently active English language Al-Firdaws forum (http://al-firdaws.org/vbe/) to the list.  These along with a recent effort to distribute practically all Al Qaeda-sponsored media into multi-lingual products points to a new phase in jihad media strategy. There's apparently an effort to push their products to an increasingly diverse readership, especially in the West.   

I found this one  just this morning, I think it's in Dutch.

Download biokhattab.pdf

Slow, Certain Radicalization in Bosnia

There's been a slow drip of terrorism news coming out of the Balkans since 2001.  Defence Academy of the United Kingdom's Advanced Research and Assessment Group has a sobering report on the rise of radicalism in the region since the end of the war, including this on Bosnia:

Aid from Islamic countries (in particular Saudi Arabia) was focused on social programmes such as building madrassas (Islamic schools) and funding programmes for war orphans, and infrastructural reconstruction projects (the rebuilding of mosques in the Muslim-dominated parts of Bosnia & Herzegovina). But the aid came with conditions. Saudi money has indeed helped fund social programmes and reconstruction of mosques, but the character of Islamic places of worship has changed significantly as a consequence. In the ten-year period since the end of armed conflict in Bosnia, around 550 new mosques have been built - primarily in the Wahhabi style. 

Dont' Worry Your Pretty Little Head

The Investigative Project has posted Georgetown University's reply to Congressman Frank Wolf's letter expressing concern over a recent, enormous infusion of cash into their -- newly renamed -- Prince Alwaleed Center for Muslim Christian Understanding.  To sum up the Center's response:  don't worry your pretty little head, Congressman:

"[A]ll of us at Georgetown University take very seriously the importance of protecting academic freedom," DeGioia wrote. "I want to assure you that I am completely confident that the Center's work, to borrow your words, ‘maintains the impartiality and integrity' that we expect of all research conducted at Georgetown University."

There's actually a passage in the letter, only touched upon in IPT's post, that points ultimately to the reasons why the prince gave the Georgetown center the money:

Another measure of the value of the Center's work is the considerable extent to which multiple U.S. government departments and senior officials -- particularly ones with extensive sophistication in issues of international concern -- have relied upon the Center's scholars for their expertise.  For example, our scholars have been called upon not only by the State Department, as you note, but also by Defense, Homeland Security and FBI officials as well as government and their agencies in Europe and Asia.  In fact, a number of high ranking U.S. military officials, prior to assuming roles with the Multi-National Force in Iraq, have sought out faculty with the Center for their expertise on the region.  Clearly, many high level government officials have recognized the high quality of the Center's scholarship and have confidence that it maintains its integrity and impartiality.  Those requests for the Center's assistance came bother before and after Prince Alwaleed's generous support.

Just What We Need

...another Saudi charity in Africa

http://www.labaik-africa.org/