Making Sense of Jihad

Around the Web

I'm working on a Mumbai post, but it's going to take a few days.  In the meantime, I would suggest you read my study of Dhiren Barot's (aka Issa al-Hindi) 1998 book, The Army of Madinah in Kashmir.  This is the memoir of an AQ emir's time fighting for Lashkar-e-Tayyiba in Kashmir.

A Free Prediction (and worth every penny of it):  In two years you're going to see package tours to Saudi Arabia and Iraq:

A group of 38 tourists from the US arrived in Tabuk Friday from Sharm El-Sheikh in Egypt. The tourist trip has come as part of the ongoing cooperation of the Saudi Supreme Commission for Tourism and local tourism companies....The government passed a law in 2007 allowing domestic travel agencies to bring in foreign tours.

In OSINT news:  The power of distributed networks to share information was on display this past week in Mumbai.  Meanwhile, the power of distributed networks to absorb information and spit it out again was on display in NYC after a Belgian cabinet minister became the subject of a blogging bartender. 

Several professional librarians organizations have teamed up to develop something better than Google: 

While experts from three top library and information science institutions have begun a process that they promise will lead to a new search engine with a new infrastructure designed to emphasize authoritative content, the process is at very early stages yet.

In other OSINT news:  You can now Google the archive of Life magazine.  Lot's of images that may be new to you, including this of the Blind Sheikh, and other curiosities.

Thomas Barnett notices the "shift into Africa." Here's a question for those readers in the IC:  Are we ready for Africa?

Mr. Axe on the Good News and Bad News in Somalia:

That’s good news, for Islamists likely represent Somalia’s future. This year, two main Islamic groups have made steady gains in the country’s south, two years after they were driven from Mogadishu by a mixed army of Ethiopians, northern Somali militiamen and U.S. Special Forces.

Something from the Yeah, duh! files:  International hotels draw elites and terror threat (AP)

In a related link, center-right talk show host Hugh Hewitt links to some good advice for corporate CEOs who find their employees in the middle of a crisis.

Abu Muqawama has a lite reading list for the Christmas holidays.

I was going to post on the Salafist and Salafist/Jihadist response to the Mumbai attacks, but the Jawa folks beat me to it.  No need to reinvent the wheel.  Lest you think it's only The Pest's little following doing this, I saw other, more "mainstream," Salafist blogs, doing the same thing.  That said, I just don't think this is important enough to blog on.

New issue of Parameters (via Small Wars Journal)

"Saudi Interior Minister Appeals to Religious and Education Establishments to Fight Ideological Extremism in the Country" (Via MEMRI)

Also, a different type of campus radical.  Or is that a radical campus? You decide!

And last but not least, a new article:

Legal Safeguards in Egypt's Petroleum Concession Agreements
Author: Khatchadourian, Minas1
Source: Arab Law Quarterly, Volume 22, Number 4, 2008 , pp. 387-396(10)

More Maududi

Last week I linked to a speech on jihad given by the great Islamist thinker Mualana Maududi.  There's much more to this man's work, and I'm increasingly interested in how he (and others) integrate the concept of jihad into a greater totality of thought. 

So here are two more

• The Economic Problem of Man and Its Islamic Solution is a pamphlet that dates from the late 1940s.
• System of Government under the Holy Prophet is a transcript of a 1978 interview given to Radio Pakistan.

The Problem is...

You may be unaware of the situation in the Gulf of Aden, so let me fill you in:  it's chaos.  Somali pirates -- some no doubt affiliated with al-Qaida's HOA affiliate, Mujahideen Youth Movement (MYM)-- are in control of the waters off the coast of Africa between the Horn and Yemen. 

It's not jihad related, not yet anyway.  The pirates are undertaking kidnapping and ransom schemes, cargo theft, etc, in an effort to pull in cash.  The problem is, they're wildly successful.  I suspect that at least some of that cash soon will be financing al-Qaida's efforts in the HOA.  If AQ hasn't already establish training camps and dawah networks within Somalia, they will be if the money continues to flow in.

EagleSpeak has been doing an excellent job covering the now-daily reports of cargo-seizures, hostage-takings, K&R transactions, etc, including news of the Iranian "mystery ship." So is Galrahn at Information Dissemination.  OSINT is coming from many corners, with news of French commandos rescuing tourists,  pirates seizing Russian tanks bound for Kenya (the MV Faina), and more stories emerging almost every day.

The Russians are sending a frigate to the region.  According to Eagle1, the Malaysians are sending ships.  The French, Italians, and Spanish have all expressed interest in sending more ships, planes, etc.  However, the situation has been deteriorating for quite some time. Last week the US Navy suggested that merchant ships hire security services, much to Galrahn's chagrin:

I also find it very frustrating that last Thursday the Admirals stood in front of the American people in Durham and discussed in detail the role of naval power to protect the global system to insure the free flow of trade, and here we have a clear example of trade disruption on the seas and the US Navy basically tells ship owners they can't solve the problem.

The problem with this "it ain't our problem" approach is that eventually it will be our problem.  Flush with cash, al Qaida will strike the region again.  From a well-funded base in Somalia, it can project its power onto the Arabian Peninsula with ease.  I suspect that we're woefully unprepared to respond to any looming threat in Somalia.  What are our intel assets like?  Do we have any MYM insiders on the payroll?  I hope so.

AQ's next major plot targeting Gulf energy infrastructure may originate in the Horn, and we may never see it coming. 

"Sahabs"

I wrote a couple of weeks ago that I was heading into a lull on posting just to get through a few articles.  Well, it didn't happen then, but is happening now.  I need a break.  Right now, I'm just more interested in "sahabs."  No not As-Sahab, these "sahabs."

Don't get me wrong.  Just because DC is easing into its summer lull, doesn't mean there's isn't plenty of interesting news and research to comment on.  For instance:

There's an ongoing policy debate over the efficacy of having our security and military  agencies "working with" radical Islamist front groups whose long term strategy is the ultimate destruction of the American way of life.

In an apparent example of economic jihad, Moroccan officials say they broke up a cell preparing attacks on tourist sites.

China's official news agency actually reports on the country's other Muslims, the Hui, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-06/23/content_8424881.htm

New Scientist reports that leftist archaeologists are going to let US and/or Israel bomb cultural sites inside Iran. 

Crossroads Arabia notes that a senior Saudi scholar called Bin Laden names, or something.  Big deal.  Unless they're willing to excommunicate him (and they won't), it doesn't matter.

Apparently, our man (al-)Libbi is too busy for video.  His latest is an audio is summarized at Internet Terrori Monitor.

Half a world away, The Pest posts pics of a smiling Abu Qatada, who has apparently fallen off the wagon on his diet.  The link is here:  http://revolution.muslimpad.com/2008/07/11/may-allah-protect-you-shaykh-abu-qataadah/

The Long War Journal reports on the surrender of the "unconventional" warlord, Bibi Aysha.  (Before you get  shocked! that a patriarchal tribal society like the ones found in SW Asia could produce a Bibi Aysha, just remember there are Western examples, too, including my favorite.)

Perspectives on Terrorism published an article exploring the "battle of ideas" from the Pakistan perspective.  Meanwhile, a new NEFA Foundation report reminds us why Pakistan is so important.

Kevin Knodell's "backgrounder" posts on Central Africa (at War is Boring here, here and here) are great starting off point for anyone curious about the region. I suspect that Central Africa is going to become a region of much greater strategic interest in the next five years.

Mihalka and Anderson have written "Is the Sky Falling?  Energy Security and Transnational Terrorism."  Good work.  I agree with the conclusion, but it is based entirely on data analysis.  Comprehensive CT analysis needs a little more. After all there were no hijack-jetliner-crash-into-skyscraper data points on September 10, 2001.  Still it's worth reading, because it sums up all the OSINT data we do have on terrorist attacks on energy infrastructure.  Their article is published in the US Navy's Center for Contemporary Conflict's journal Strategic Insights.

Speaking of oil IntelFusion recently linked to a Harvard-based report on the possible impact of a closure of the Straits of Hormuz.  It's a reminder of how complex and -- vulnerable -- the global energy supplies are to "outside" events.

And speaking of IntelFusion, they're reporting on new efforts by DoD in something called "cloud computing." See also this KMWorld report.

I'm back to those clouds again.  Posting will be light over the next two weeks as I seek to get a little more out of my summer of "independence."

Saudi Response - And the plot itself

Given the current hysterics over the price of gas here in the US, you would think that something like the thwarting of a third large scale attack against oil installations in Saudi Arabia would garner a bit more attention.  But, the only news trickling out about this week's arrests are in the Saudi and other Peninsula papers. 

What's interesting is the scope of the plot. It appears to have been as ambitious as the ones from previous years.  It included a maritime element to attack "offshore" facilities (ie. Ras Tanura).

Saudi Gazette (via BBC monitoring - no link), notes what Will at Jihadica discusses here, that the plotters were informed by Abu Bakr al-Naji's Management of Savagery.

[Maj. Gen. Mansour Al-Turki] told Okaz that investigations conducted with the arrested terrorist groups revealed that they were working under a strategy mentioned in the seized books talking about "the management of barbarism" (Idarat At-Tawahhush).

Back in September 2005, I noted that this book could reflect al-Qaida's "current operational thinking:"

As for the larger attacks on petroleum infrastructure, he offers a step-by-step ideological, media, and physical plan of attack.First, the movement’s experts would gather data to support their claims of injustice.   In this case, “an economic specialist among its member can conduct a study that demonstrates the real value and real price of oil…” The report would go on to show the “extent of the unfairness and plunder to which the nation was subjected for decades…”

Second, the movement would demand that all countries that import oil should pay the fair price, “while preserving the Muslim people’s right to demand payment that would cover the price discrepancy throughout all previous years.”

Third, a period of time would be given, in his words, “to assess the degree of responsiveness to this declaration.”  If nothing happens, then “attack would begin on the oil installation, particularly the pipelines, the bombing of which does not involve killing people.  The oil tankers that are managed and operated by infidels would be attacked.  Oil installation and refineries would be attacked at such times when that are empty of workers to avoid hurting Muslims persons.”  However, he adds, regarding the “sentries” at oil installations:  if they are members of the local army they should be “treated as traitors to their nations” and as for private security companies, “They may be attacked only if they try to kill or capture some of the attacking mujahideen…”

Saudis thwarting a large-scale attack is getting to be a regular summer event, like July 4th or the shorebird migration.  It's a sign of their CT efforts that many of the plotters appear to have been from countries other than Saudi Arabia, but next year may be a difference story, since even more Iraq and Afghan-hardened mujahideen will have returned to their homelands on the Peninsula.

Perhaps more important than countering these cells, is getting to the brains of these energy plots (which are clearly top-down affairs):  Ayman al-Zawahiri.

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UPDATE:  Via MEMRI Economic Blog (emphasis mine)

Saudis Reveal that Terrorists Were Targeting Oil Installations in Gulf Countries
06/27/2008

High-level Saudi security officials told the Kuwaiti daily, al-Qabas, that members of a terrorist cell, some non-Saudis, arrested by the Saudi security forces, were planning to sabotage oil installations in the Gulf countries. They were also planning to use speed boats to carry on attacks against off-shore installations and ships. The Saudi authorities added that the terrorists were planning to carry out their attacks at a big distance from their base of operations. Pictures of major hotels frequented by visitors in some major Gulf cities and city maps were also confiscated.

al-Qabas, June 27, 200

Good News Out of KSA (Continued)

Saudi newspapers have reported more information on this week's arrests, including hints at the methods of recruitment.  According to this AKI report, Saudi paper Al-Watan is reporting that Zawahiri played a central role in this plot, but there's more, and I've highlighted some key pieces of information with my comments:

According to al-Watan, the police found audio files with the recordings of al-Zawahiri's voice on the mobile phone belonging to the leader of the Saudi terror cell. It is believed there were at least two such messages.

In these messages, al-Zawahiri clearly explained how all the mujahadeen and recruits from north Africa, Iraq and Southeast Asia, were required to carry out carbomb attacks targeting oil installations and the headquarters of local security forces in the country.

I am going to hazard a guess that Zawahiri's audio tape included arguments, if not direct citation, from Bin Rashid's fatwa (see here).

The discovery of the messages are believed to be linked to the announcement on Wednesday by Saudi officials that 701 people have been detained in recent months for their alleged involvement in terrorist activities. Out of this group, 520 are still under arrest.

According to the the London-based Arabic-language newspaper, al-Sharq al-Awsat, only 50 percent of those arrested were Saudi citizens.

A Saudi-based attack that does not include a majority of Saudis is indeed a fascinating development.  It suggests that Saudi CT efforts have created a hostile environment for recruiting followers from within the country.  Further information at the end of the report, bares this out because it appears that many of the individuals arrested this year were recruited from other countries.

The others entered the country during the Haj pilgrimage to Mecca and did not return to their home countries.

A large number of those arrested reportedly included citizens from Yemen, Morocco, Kuwait and Chad as well as some Mauritanians, Pakistanis, Afghans and Indonesians.

The report said that almost all of them were recruited by imams in their home countries who were close to al-Qaeda or through various internet sites or web forums that spread Jihadist propaganda.

The last sentence at once highlights the power of distributed information, and the continued use of it by senior AQ leadership to recruit members for "the Vanguard." It also discounts the "leaderless jihad" theory in that at least some of the operatives were recruited directly from religious leaders.

The 2008 arrests represent the fourth year in a row that Saudis have broken up large, ambitious plots against facilities that directly service the global oil market.

UPDATE:  The Guardian provides a little more information:

Saudi security forces carried out several operations and arrested 701 people of various nationalities, said the ministry spokesman, General Mansour al-Turki. Of those, 520 - divided into five cells - were still being held for involvement in the organisational and ideological plans of the "deviant ideology" - the Saudi official term for al-Qaida.

Terrorist cells that large are most likely autonomous, in that they operate their own logistical, operational and media elements.  This too hints at a top down command of KSA operations probably from AQ leadership along the Afghan-Pakistan border since all these independent cells were working toward the same strategic ends. 

Zadi’s Analysis

Last week, Will at Jihadica posted pointed to an essay on oil that was “making the rounds on the forums.”  The essay attempts to place into perspective Al Qaida’s strategic interest in attacking energy targets.  According to Will’s summary, the essay’s author, Zadi al-Taqwa, interprets AQ’s interest in “purely economic” terms.  Though Zadi’s analysis sounds interesting, it is safe to say that he is no economist and has little knowledge of AQ’s intent or capabilities as it regards energy. 

Zadi’s analysis may not be an official AQ product, but it’s always interesting to see how energy issues are discussed in the online jihadi world, because a very important group read and participate in those forums discussions:  emirs.  These are the leaders of regional affiliates (like Zarqawi) or individual cells (like Mohammed Atta) who function with a certain amount of autonomy even in target selection.  I always have that audience in mind when I read forum postings.  Is this information or analysis an emir can use decisively? 

Of all the energy related material I’ve seen over the years very few documents or discussions have given me cause for concern.  Zadi’s analysis can be added to the list of the uninformed and ineffective.  His list of factors for high oil prices is inaccurate or amateurish. Will notes that Zadi’s analysis doesn’t include mention of any “religious justifications.”  That’s a big problem, because AQ’s “petroleum” fatwa is the axis around which AQ’s strategic intentions revolve.  I'm reluctant to respond in detail to an essay I haven't seen in its entirety in translation.  Without knowledge of its content, it's difficult to make solid arguments or analytical conclusions.

There are specific sources of information, most written and published within key Al Qaida circles, that communicate the group’s strategic intent, project its capabilities, and include its religious justifications related to energy targets.  Studying these document gives you a good idea of the scope and character of AQ's threat to energy infrastructure.  If the Jihadica summary is accurate (and I have no reason to doubt it), Zadi doesn't belong in this collection.

And so Zadi goes on the growing list of clueless posters to jihadi forums who talk about oil as if they know something.  It would be great if oil and gas targeting was never a topic of discussion, but as long as it is this poorly informed, they can talk away.

AQ in Yemen's Economic Jihad

Al Qaida's affiliate in Yemen claimed responsibility for a "failed" attack on an oil refinery located near Aden last week:

Three blasts were heard on Friday at the refinery in the southern port city of Aden, officials said.

"Al Qaeda Organisation in the Arabian Peninsula -- Yemen Soldiers Brigades -- carried out the blessed operation with three mortar shells ... on the refinery used by Yemen's despot to supply fuel to the Crusaders (Western states) in their war against Islam," the group said on an Islamist website.

It's just another incident where the group targets one of two key economic sectors within Yemen: energy and tourism. 

The extent of the group's ability to recruit, train, fund, and execute attacks is not widely understood using just open source information, but its emphasis on targeting energy infrastructure sites in Yemen does not bode well for energy sites in other areas of the Arabian Peninsula.  It would be easy for an AQ cell -- some members now "veterans" of Iraq and/or Afghanistan --  to draw lessons learned from the Yemen-based economic jihad and combine it with paramilitary skills honed in other parts of the world. 

Yemen may become the proving ground for Al Qaida's next big attack (or attempted attack) on the Arabian Peninsula.

Growth in Islamic Banking

More news (via MEMRI blog) on the astonishing growth of Islamic banking, including this little note of dread:

Measured by population the proposed size of the Islamic economy should be about $12 trillion out of a total global economy of $60 trillion. Yet, the Islamic economy has not reached $5 trillion, suggesting a need for greater efforts to integrate the Islamic economy into the global economy.

Dependency

Daveed Gartenstein-Ross’s new policy brief for the Foundation for Defense of Democracies summarizes some of the strategic consequences of our current dependence on foreign oil.  His arguments aren't  new, they have just taken on new resonance as the price of gasoline has put oil on everyone's brain these days.  The argument against further dependence on foreign oil are in summary that,

• petrodollars support terrorism
• it increases supply vulnerability to terrorism
• the cost of crude is negatively affecting our overall economic stability and food prices

I mostly agree with him, but the purpose of this post is to point out that the arguments and solutions that Gartenstein-Ross offer are more complex than at first glance.  A closer look at two of the common arguments in the FDD report will, I hope, be an informal introduction to a very complex dynamic at work.  This post doesn't represent a formal analytical piece, rather it is a synthesis of a few ideas rattling around in my head after reading the FDD brief.

You won’t find me disagreeing with Gartenstein-Ross’ first argument that our dependence on foreign oil causes us to “fund both sides of the terror war.”  Money pouring into Persian Gulf countries is finding its way into the hands of terrorist groups, and more important, global radicalization efforts operating under the false cover of  “dawah.”  The rise of Islamic banking -- and the impenetrable, exclusive culture of Islamic scholars who run it -- poses its own threat, one that we are woefully unprepared to handle.  I dedicate a great deal of content on this blog to awareness of the petrodollar power emerging from the Gulf.  It’s one of the reason why I believe that regardless of Al Qaeda’s losses in Iraq, time is on their side.  The GCC recently reported that member countries were expecting a 12 trillion dollar cash surplus over the next five years.  Even if a mere.001 percent of that cash reaches Al Qaeda, that’s 12 billion dollars.  That’s a lot of jihad.

Please read my new article in the Combating Terrorism Center’s Sentinel journal for my opinion on Al Qaeda’s threat to energy infrastructure in the Gulf.  Gartenstein-Ross and I agree on this count, as well.

The core problem here isn’t that we’re sending our money into the Gulf.  It’s that Gulf beneficiaries are using their new-found wealth to remake Islam in their own image, and we have no strategy for combating these dawah efforts. 

Besides, it wouldn’t cease, even if we could end our dependence on Saudi and Iraqi crude tomorrow.  There would be other countries willing to take up the slack, especially China.  In other words, Saudi Arabia would not be hard pressed to find another client.  As a matter of fact, Gulf countries may be already exploiting China’s dependence on their oil, by convincing the Chinese government to permit members of their Muslim community to train at Gulf madrasas.  Readers of this blog are informed enough to understand the possible long-term implications of Wahhabist training and dawah.

Also, if we were to pull our oil interests from the Gulf tomorrow, it would alter our geopolitical standing in the region.  We would no longer be a strategic player in a significant region of the world.  Far from retreating from the Gulf, I believe we should be meddling more:  more diplomats, more soldiers, more military bases, more corporations, more tourists.  12 trillion surplus dollars converts to substantial global geopolitical power for countries that are no bigger than the state of Rhode Island.  Instead of whining, we should be asserting our geopolitical muscle when it is needed.

Another argument often heard is the call for fuel alternatives.  In very real terms alternative energy sources are still decades -- decades -- away.  Are they worth pursuing?  Yes.  Will any provide an alternative to current energy prices?  Absolutely not. 

Case in point: the number of long haul trucks on the road is an important indicator of economic growth.  More buying going on here in the States, means the more goods being manufactured overseas.  When those new goods reach our shores at points like the port of Los Angeles, those products have to make it to the Wal-Mart or supermarket shelves, and more often than not they are getting their by truck.  When there is an alternative fuel that can fuel an 18-wheeler from LA to Maine, then we have finally found an alternative source of energy.  The same goes for planes.  The alternative fuel we’re all looking for to solve our current problems just doesn’t exist. 

For the record, I would love to see the end of our oil-based economy, but only if the alternative is clean and reliable and could fuel economic growth.  The fact is we’re as close to an oil-free economy as we are to a paper-free bathroom.  Yet that doesn’t mean our policy should be to have our public leaders gripe about the rising prices, and sit helplessly by while unstable countries play games with or lose total control over their crude supplies. 

For example: Nigeria is a mess.  How bad could it be for one of our top suppliers?  Shell, the biggest company in country, has been in a near constant state of force majeure since the beginning of the year.  That means they have been unable to meet their contracts due to circumstances way out of their control.  Well, the entire country is spiraling out of control.  Are we doing anything to support security and stability in Nigeria?  Do we even have a Nigeria policy?

Cue the crickets chirping.

It’s not enough to say we need to end our “dependence” on foreign oil and find alternative fuels.  Neither idea is realistic.  Rather, we should be turning this volatile market into a strategic advantage.  We’re not the only country hurting under the rising costs of crude, but we are the United States, the most productive country on earth, and the world’s only superpower.  Countries all over the world have a stake in American economic stability, and we have a stake in seeing that oil markets work to our advantage.

A Warning for Yemen

AKI reports tonight that the head of Al Qaeda's Yemen affiliate has publicly warned foreign tourists to leave the country.

"We warn all the unbelievers who enter the Arabian Peninsula that [targeting] their money and their blood are religiously right for us," said al-Qaeda of the Jihad in the South of the Arabian Peninsula in a statement that was published in its e-magazine entitled "Epic Echo".

"We want to tell you that if you enter the Arabian Peninsula under any name or cover, whether as tourists, diplomats, university professors or journalists, know that we are justified in targeting you," said the statement.

"We do not respect any of the agreements signed by the Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh and various governments."

The terrorists also mentioned the al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and accused Europeans of not having accepted his offer of peace offered to European governments in April 2004.

The last paragraph is most important, because it highlights Al Qaeda's persistence.  The warning given to Europeans in 2004 caused a fuss at the time, but has long since been forgotten by most Americans and Europeans.  But Bin Laden's ultimatum to Europe was following the traditional rubric of warning your enemy before you attack.  Europeans -- like the Americans -- were probably expecting an attack somewhere in Western Europe.  There have been two major attacks in Europe, and several near operational plots thwarted, but nothing on the grand scale of 9-11. 

However, Al Qaeda's strategic thinking with Europe parallels its U.S. strategy. It doesn't need to attack Europeans in Europe when it can do it closer to their area of operations, ie Afghanistan.  This is the thinking behind their energy threat strategy: retreat, retrench, rebuild, and attack the enemy's economic foundations.  Yemen is increasingly becoming tourist destination for Europeans, and Al Qaeda's branch there has become increasingly effective at harming the country's key economic growth sectors:  tourism and  energy.

The threat should be taken seriously.

Al Qaeda's capabilities in Yemen are growing, even as they flee Iraq.  The Yemeni group could end up benefiting from an Iraq pull out with new skilled, battle-hardened fighters as the group's leadership decides to move their mujahideen from one region of "open jihad" (Iraq) to others like Afghanistan, Somalia, and Yemen. 

If pressure isn't placed on the group now through government efforts, then we could see the re-invigoration of the Saudi branch of the group along with the emergence of a new, effective Al Qaeda branch in Yemen. Yemen's cultural, familial, and ethnic ties with Saudi Arabia are very strong, and many Saudi Al Qaeda members are of Yemeni heritage.  With an increase capacity to organize, fund, operate and regularly communicate, Al Qaeda's Yemeni branch could become the next breeding and training ground for an attack on "economic" targets in Saudi Arabia, most likely energy facilities.

Yemen and Economic Jihad

MEMRI's Islamist Website Monitoring Project recently highlighted an article from issue 8 of Jihad Press, a periodical that gets comprehensive distribution throughout the online global jihad "community."  The article itself proposes a strategy of economic jihad that has only been hinted at in the past, specifically attacking maritime targets:

On April 26, 2008, the Islamist website Al-Ikhlas posted an article from Jihad Press, an e-journal reportedly linked to Al-Qaeda, which urges the mujahideen to establish naval terror cells. The article argues that gaining control over the seas and sea passages – especially around the Arabian Peninsula – is a vital step towards renewing the global Islamic caliphate.

Yes, the VLCC Limburg was an early example, but it may have also been too early in the group's strategic development.  After all, the motorboat attack is as effective in its environment as the car bomb is in Iraq or Algeria.  Al Qaeda -- with its active cells in Yemen and Somalia -- could have undertaken numerous such attempts since 2002.  It hasn't.  When you read strategic documents like Management of Savagery, a maritime strategy isn't mentioned at all.  Why?

I think one of the reasons is that Al Qaeda sees maritime attacks as part of an economic jihad front, different from the open jihad fronts in places like Afghanistan and Iraq.  Only now are we seeing these ideas coalesce, and still very slowly.  Yemen has become a sort of test bed for economic jihad, as AQ cells have targeted both the country's energy infrastructure and its tourism industry.  These are two key industries not only in Yemen, but the entire Gulf region.  Lessons learned from a successful economic jihad in Yemen could easily be applied in other Gulf countries.

Geographically inseparable from the rest of the Arabian Peninsula, Al Qaeda's ideological world view doesn't recognize the international border between Yemen and Saudi Arabia.  What happens there, in essence, happens in the strategic context of the entire Peninsula.  Any future attacks on energy infrastructure whether ground or maritime, could very well have their source in Yemen.