Making Sense of Jihad

Let Me Be the First to Say It

Well, probably not "the first" per se, but here you go:

Kenya has a problem.  A really big problem.  And that is not good.

The arrest of Sheikh al-Faisal  (more here) by Kenyan authorities on Christmas Eve and the subsequent protests have brought to light the presence of Kenyan's very own Salafist-jihadis.  Al-Qaida has been operating there for at least two decades, and al-Shabaab must have fund-raising cells and wealthy and well-connected sympathizers among Kenya's enormous Somali expat and refugee community.  However, the character and extent of Kenya's native Salafist-jihadi presence is unknown and ignored for the most part.  However, the possibility of its spread must be considered a legitimate strategic threat in the region.

Kenya is sort of a strategic buffer stalling Shabaab-style Salafist-Jihadism's spread into Eastern, Sub-Saharan Africa.  If that community of al-Faisal admirers grows, it could spread throughout the region, giving al-Qaida a future in a region they currently have no "present." 

For the radicals' take on al-Faisal's arrest, start here:

http://muslimsinkenya.wordpress.com/2010/01/09/protests-in-kenya-as-muslims-vent-anger-over-cleric’s-deportation/

http://muslimsinkenya.wordpress.com/2010/01/06/sh-abdullah-feisla-al-jamaiki-being-held-by-the-kenyan-police/

http://forums.islamicawakening.com/f18/shaikh-faisal-arrested-kenya-32079/

http://revolutionmuslim.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2413:qpolice-seize-jamaican-muslim-clericq&catid=11:revolutionary-media&Itemid=15

A Second Look

The most popular post on MSJ by far is the series I did on Hassan al-Banna's On Jihad.  Few days go by where I don't see a bread crumb from a social bookmarking site, a wikipedia page, or a google hit. 

Might I suggest my other al-Banna work: Toward the Light.  I know everyone is interested in "jihad," but for al-Banna, jihad had a reason.  That reason was -- and continues to be -- the creation of an Islamic state.  Toward the Light is al-Banna's treatise on good Islamic governance.  It describes the end-game of their jihad, and worth reading if only to understand the reason why they fought then and why they're fighting now.

Good Question

"Est-ce que Mouhammad Qotb a des erreurs dans la Aquida?"

Available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/10979605/Mouhammad-Qotb

The Bromance Continues

Looks like yet another jihobbyist has a man crush on Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi:

http://www.archive.org/details/MAQ4ed

American Salafist-Jihadism Emerges

Despite numerous arrests, convictions, reports of recruitment activities, and general vile behavior, the United States' small but very vocal Salafist-Jihadist (SJ) community saw its first inspired terrorist attack on US soil last week at Fort Hood.  Numerous British and US reports paint a picture of a man who was active in this small, mostly virtual community.  As Jarret (and Jihadica and Jawa Report) report, Hasan's violence has been met with elation in the US SJ community and on English language jihadi forums:

Bottom line up front: On the English-language, pro AQ websites, Nidal Malik Hasan’s attack at Ft Hood is being hailed as a victory for Islam and al-Qaida. The participants involved in the discussion see this as the opening shot in what they hope to be a long and bloody war in the United States.

These reports also highlight the key role of Anwar al-Awlaki, an American scholar of Islamic law who was once touted in the local press as a young, moderate leader of Northern Virginia's burgeoning suburban Muslim community.  This while the FBI was investigating his connections to several of the 9-11 hijackers. Interestingly, anyone who has been monitoring the US-based SJ community was well aware of the centrality of Awlaki's role in it.  After he fled the United States, he landed in Yemen and has been running an "American"-language blog (written in prefect idiomatic American English) since 2007-2008 (I'm working from memory here).  His posts, audio and video commentaries, and fatawa, were prominently displayed throughout the US-based SJ community.  That he has only now come to the awareness of many in the military and intelligence communities, is more evidence of the appalling mediocrity and endemic bureaucratic indifference that defines the policy and analysis industries here in Washington, DC.

Since it emerged in earnest back in 2005-6 with a collection of blogs and websites, America's SJ virtual community has expanded its presence to include active members of Scribd, Archive.org, and Youtube.  However, it appears to be more talk than action.  Reports following the arrest of Tarek Mehanna and 2 associates, make this small circle of terrorist wannabes appear to rather hapless.  Most of the global SJ action remains in the Middle East and South Asia.  Arabic and Urdu are still the primary languages of SJ ideology.  The US network's only real religious authority has been the commentary and fatawa of al-Awlaki.

The Fort Hood attack has changed all this, however.  It's clear that Hasan was very active in the US SJ community.  He communicated with al-Awlaki, and there are now reports that he was talking to others as well.  His 2007 power point presentation on Islam is the crystallization of the SJ ideology, expressed in American English, intended for an American audience.

There is good news here, if you can call it that.  Hasan's attack may have happened too soon in the SJ community's development.  The community still lacks authoritative heft it needs to be taken seriously inside the global movement (like a "Blind Sheikh").  By "coming of age" too soon, it may doom itself to jihadi caricature.   That may change in the next 5-10 years as recently convicted Salafist-Jihadis are released from prison, having had many years to study and delve deeper into the justifications for violence.  It's hard to predict what if any will be the impact of this cadre of radical American Muslims with prison cred, but I can practically guarantee that it will shock our policy and intelligence communities.

A Not So Galloping Steed

I was over at the Pest's website today and noticed that he recently posted a link to a new video of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi astride a steed.  The video quality is so-so, but it's clear he doesn't ride very often (if at all); he looks uncomfortable, like this is his first time and is quite jazzed at the experience.  If this is the case, I don't blame him. Anyone who sits on a horse for the first time gets that same stupid smile on their face, <ahem>.  The other thing that struck me about this video is its existence. Why on earth was he on a horse in the first place?  And who would agree to be videotaped in such a silly situation?

It doesn't really matter, I know.  In the end, it's just more raw material for the jihobbyist toiling away with their video editing software in their parents' basements.  From this point on every video production featuring everyone's favorite scholar will include his moment astride a steed.

Salafist-Jihadist Fitnah in Action

Presented without commentary:

"Palestinian Gaza Ansar al-Sunnah leader Al-Maqdisi elaborates ideology."

"Al-Sabil Interviews Theorist of the Salafi Jihadist Movement." (Excerpts)

I've been reading reports of Abu Mohammed al-Maqdisi's increasing moderation since the "Zarqawi crisis" of 2005-06.  If by moderation you mean clarifying the permissibility of insurgency and murder, then well, I guess the guy has morphed into a fuzzy bunny, but I wouldn't invite him to speak at the local food co-op any time soon.  In a June interview to with Wa'il al-Battiri for Amman al-Sabil we have a good idea of where Maqdisi has been heading since the descent of AQ in Iraq into a GIA-style bloodbath.  AQ Central's strategic thinking parallels Maqdisi, undergoing similar modifications at least since Zawahiri's 2005 letter to Zarqawi.  It's seen more recently in the Taliban's revised rules of engagement. 

AQAP's assassination attempt on KSA's counterterrorism chief, Prince Muhammed bin Nayif, could be interpreted through this strategy.  AQ gains more by targeting their attacks on Saudi leaders, counterterrorism officials, and other security elements, and by plotting attacks on infrastructure, not the general populace.  See coverage here, here and here.

I'm not a sociologist, but I do know enough about the Arab Middle East to recognize the general strengths and weaknesses of those societies.  Family is still very important, and the individual's ties to their family counts for much of the social cohesion in those mostly-failing states.  AQ generally looses support when they target civilians, or in the case of Iraq, entire families, because such attacks tear at the heart of social cohesion and stability. Conversely, most governments in the Arab Middle East are weak, unreliable, and disconnected from the general populace.  By concentrating operations on military and security elements within weak governments AQ has learned to target the softest spot on the beast (see The Management of Savagery, 2005).  And considering some of its recent strategic success, it is an effective strategy so far.

This is why I believe the June interview illuminates a significant and troubling trend.  Maqdisi spends most of the time clarifying past misconceptions and false statements.  Far from moderating his views, he's honing them.

From the article introduction

Al-Maqdisi was released [from prison] on 12 March 2008. The media reported that the security authorities set the condition that he would not give any press interviews - an order by which he abided. Over the past few months he refused to give statements to the press, leading to a great deal of controversy.

In this interview, given more than a year after his release, Al-Maqdisi touches on many stances that he adopts or calls for, refuting extremist views on takfir [holding other Muslims to be infidel] that are attributed to him. He also deals with many other issues.

From the interview: On takfir

[Al-Battiri] Concerning the issues of takfir to which you alluded, do you not think that certain youths display their ignorance by talking about these issues? Indeed, many of them wrote discourses and made allegations that tarnished the image of the movement. Because of them the notion spread that this movement holds the majority of people to be infidels.

[Al-Maqdisi] Yes, some of the young men with deficient knowledge might make such an error. Therefore, as I have said, I give the youth advice and I urge them to seek knowledge. This would save them from the pitfalls of extremism. I wrote my book Al-Waqafat [Stances] in which I offered advice to the youth on practical issues. I also gave them advice on religious studies and faith- related issues in my book Al-Risalah Al-Thalathiniyah Fi Al-Tahdhir Min Akhta al-Takfir [Thirty Examples Warning Against Wrong Takfiri Practices]. In this book, I mentioned in detail the conditions and prohibitions concerning takfir. I warned against extremism in takfir and drew attention to 33 examples of either well known or grave takfiri practices, which I did not want the youths to slip into.

From the interview: On civilian Muslim targets

[Al-Battiri] Given the bombings that occur here and there in countries around the world, can you speak to us about the inviolability of the blood of Muslims in Islamic shari'ah, given that some might blow up an entire building just to kill one or two soldiers?

[Al-Maqdisi] No doubt God the legislator held the Muslim's blood, property, and honour to be inviolable. In a reliably-proven saying of the Prophet - peace and blessings of God be upon him - at the inviolable city, and in the inviolable month on the day of the major pilgrimage, he said: "Your blood and property will be as inviolable to you as this day, this month, and this city, until you meet with your God on doomsday." The Prophet said: "Have I given my message?" They replied: "Yes." He said: "God be my witness. Let those present inform those who are absent. So many serve as conveyers of warnings but many others would not convey what they hear. Therefore, do not become infidels after me, each striking the neck of the other."

Our ulema said that violating the blood of a Muslim is a great iniquity. The iniquity of letting 1,000 infidels escape is smaller than the sin of shedding a drop of blood of any Muslim. Therefore, one should not be lenient about the sin of shedding the blood of Muslims based on suspicion, jihad, or other things. Indeed, the blood and properties of disobedient Muslims cannot be violated even if they commit iniquities. It is our duty to call them into religion and try to bring them from darkness to light and not to engage with them in battles.

I have written on this many times and I dissociated myself from the undisciplined operations that others commit outside the bounds of shari'ah - operations that result in thousands of victims and in which much blood is shed without any legitimate benefits to jihad or Muslims.

And,

[Al-Battiri] What about the bombing of cinema houses?

[Al-Maqdisi] If this is intended to kill the iniquitous, then this is forbidden and a crime that is impermissible in any way. It is not a legitimate means of fighting vice. The killing of such disobedient people as a form of punishment is an injustice, transgression, and infringement on the word of God. It is an illegitimate punishment. Even if the attacks do not kill anyone, they are still mistakes in terms of shari'ah policy and priorities. Bombing movie theatres does not stop disobedience. Some youths tried this and they were given long prison terms, spending the primes of their lives in jail, and eventually coming out of prison without any achievements. Moreover, this also means opening a confrontation with the public, who have the right to have us work with them in Islamic preaching and not in fighting and killing.

Source: BBC Monitoring Middle East. London: Jun 5, 2009. ProQuest document 1740306621.

Debate

Some fine individual using the name ID al_moqna3@hotmail.com or al_moqna321 today uploaded this to the world's favorite jihadi media hosting site.

http://ia301526.us.archive.org/2/items/debate121/

It's too late at night for me to date the video, but my guess is it's from the late 1990s.

Muhammed Qutb

My eagle-eyes missed this archival video of Muhammed Qutb, Sayyid Qutb's brother, in what appears to be a late-70s or 80s-era lecture in Saudi Arabia.  It was uploaded in March with someone using an uploader ID with a "yahoo.fr" e-mail address.

http://ia331434.us.archive.org/2/items/mofajermohad/

Something Old, Something New

Dying to see more of the Blind Sheikh?  Well, someone who gave the e-mail address " abda88@hotmail.it" uploaded a collection of Omar Abdel Rahman videos.  So far, at least one is new to me. 

http://ia350636.us.archive.org/3/items/KishkRmv/

UPDATE:

I just noticed that the same uploader ID recently posted a video of one of my favorites among the crazy sheikhs, Khaled Something or Other.

http://www.archive.org/details/TsunamiKaledArrached

I can't remember his exact name, but who cares?  There is one video of a sermon he gave that culminated with his complete emotional unraveling.  It was worth every minute it took to download.  Let's see if this one has anything to offer.

abo mohemed elmaqdesi

Someone using the username, "tawheed@islam.com" and employing the kind of tag word combo that sets off "Hi, this is jihadi media here!" flags, also posted this to Archive<dot>org.

http://www.archive.org/details/tawhedf

The metadata says it all.

tawhedf menber tawheed waljehad abo mohemed elmaqdesi movies opensource_movies abo mohemed elmaqdesi
 تحية طيبة لاخواننا الموحدين نسال الله ان يعزبكم دينه وينصربكم ضعفائه
 هذا موقع منبر التوحيد والجهاد بكل ما يحتوي من كتب ورسائل يكنك تحميله الان
 زائد اللقاء للشيخ ابومحمد المقدسي مع قنات الجزيرة 2009 2009 forqan ; ansar ; alshouraa ; faloja ; benladen ; zwahery 2009-05-01 22:46:20 2009-05-01 22:45:09 tawheed@islam.com islamali 2009-05-01 23:03:48 sound color 2009-05-01 23:18:39 islamali

UPDATE:

It's a .zip file. I noticed long ago that  jihobbyist* like to "hide" their files in Archive by employing a little bit of technical subterfuge.  They change the extension on a file from its original (in this case a .zip) to one more appropriate for the the "movies" section of Archive (in this case it is a .mpg or .avi).  If you open the file up in a raw text edit program you see the real extension coding.  You just change the extension.

The Google "translation" of the Arabic shown here reflects the obvious.  This isn't a movie, it's a collection of docs from Al-Maqdisi's website, tawhed.ws running on some kind of .exe file with a bunch of Java-enabled capabilities.  I would never run the .exe even if I did own a PC, but in this case, it doesn't matter.  The content is in the docs directory, and that was created in July 2007.

Around the Web - Easter-Week Mega Edition

I know, I know.  I've been remiss in my duties to post an Around the Web, and now I've been writing one for what feels like a week. It's going to take you about a week to get through it, too, but I don't want to hear any whining. It's a slow week in most offices.  If you can catch up on your fantasy baseball picks, you can read this post.  

We start with Jihadica, and the squibs from hell: Thomas surveys recent jihadi publications. They also have a roundup of their recent Workshop in Oslo (Part I and Part II). Excellent work all around.

Staying in Europe:  Italian police carried out CT raids last week:

Three of them, who lived in Naples, are though to be Islamist radicals sympathetic to the radical 'Takfiri' ideology...The three radicals had already been involved in falsifying documents to aid jihadist groups.

Meanwhile the Financial Times throws some cold water on all this talk of Islamic finance saving the world. [This talk concerns me, because the vast majority of people who know known nothing about Islamic finance.] (via Aqoul)

And the Times of London is reporting on something that happened, what?  Two weeks ago?

Holy Spicolli!  Abu Muqawama is an actual...guy.  I thought he was just a blog.

In Stage One, the agency (in this case the FBI) embraces radical Islamist front groups.  In Stage Two reality sets in and said agency withdraws their cooperation with groups, once understood that they share the same goals as AQ.  In Stage Three these "moderate" groups start making bizarre accusations hoping to test and intimidate said agency. In Stage Four said agency will apologize for something it's not doing and cave to all demands.

So where does the money go?  This recent Reuters list of "Gulf Arab foreign investments" gives you some idea. (via The Arabist)

I welcome to the club of "blogs she reads":

Shariah Finance Watch

http://www.shariahfinancewatch.org/blog/

And a jihadi blog (via The Pest)

http://millatibraheem.wordpress.com/

Flash: there are Salafi groups in the Levant, according to MEMRI there's a new Salafist-Jihadist one in Gaza, and two S-Js reported killed in Gaza.

Meanwhile, MB's Supreme Guide plans to retire.

And apparently there's a little competition for hearts and minds inside Egypt -- and it's not between "moderates" either

Good/Bad News from Libya? (via CBSNews)

An updated CRS Backgrounder on Egypt (via The Arabist)

Morocco apparently takes sides in the struggle between Sunni Arab states and Iran.  Meanwhile, there are still plenty of jihadis in North Africa, including Salafi-Jihadis in Morocco.

The Patriarch of Venice asks an essential question at the heart of the Christianity-Islam debate in a new book "Mestizaje: coexistence, or confusion?"

Speaking of Africa: The Pest of all people pointed out the novel qualities of a current release from AQ's Somalia branch.  It's an all-English video, featuring an American muj, rapping, or something. 
More at Jawa Report, Danger Room, and others including here and here.

The Pest's post is here: http://revolution.thabaat.net/?p=1096

You can find it here: http://www.archive.org/details/kmen-bradle

The video does suggest that there is an audience for this jihadi vileness in the US, and belies the commonly acknowledged trope that "our" Muslims (ie, the US) are not as radical as "their" Muslims (ie. Europe). Perhaps, but then, how do we know?  

Over in Yemen, Waq-al-Waq notes a recent article in AQ's periodical Sada al-Malahim that provides some "good background" on KSA's 85 Most Wanted.

And MEMRIBlog reports that Yemeni officials have their own Most Wanted list

Via EagleSpeak: Somali Pirates: U.S.Navy sees a new pattern

The List: If you're interested in Israeli politics, here's the list of new government officials.

Evil.  Pure Evil.

A virtual crisis for AQ?  Tim has the link.

What about the analog version of the group? Al Qaeda Today:  a Policy Forum luncheon hosted by The Washington Institute's Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence. (PolicyWatch #1477: Special Forum Report)

Drew has a post on a recent study that challenges the work of Robert Pape: Decision Processes of a Suicide Bomber

Question to the audience: How many suicide bombings in a row before it's called an offensive?
It must be Spring.

Is Bin Laden Just the Unfrozen Caveman Lawyer?

I read this post by Douglas Farah the other day, and couldn't help but hear Phil Hartman say, "Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I'm just a caveman, your world frightens me.."

The idea that this pre-modern personality is sitting back on his safehouse chaise and fussing over his relevancy just smacks of post-modern analysis.  Now, I'm not saying Farah is right or wrong here. For all I know, Bin Laden is some preening narcissist who does worry about whether al-Shabbab cares about him.  However, the idea of Bin Laden pondering his relevancy just seems odd when you consider the fact that he has the full might of American military power attempting to kill him these past eight years.

He's not a metrosexual, folks.  He doesn't get his nails done, and he's not toking some weed, looking up at the stars, and thinkin' about God and the universe and stuff.  He's more "average medieval cleric"  than "unfrozen caveman lawyer."

He used to be a wealthy, pampered jetsetter, but now he's the new Old Man of the Mountain.

Just a reminder...

...that they never shut up.

An Address to the Muslims from Abû Qatâdah,

‘Umar ibn Mahmûd Abû ‘Umar

Commentary on the decision of the British House of Lords approving of the government rendering him to the Jordanian government.

 

http://tibyan.wordpress.com/2009/03/23/an-address-to-the-muslims-from-abu-qatadah-‘umar-ibn-mahmud-abu-‘umar/

It's a cult of personality that borders on idolatrous.  I recall the words of Abu Mu'sab al-Suri regarding this very same man:

"The youth adhere faithfully to their shaykhs, and attach a holiness and infallibility to them."  (Lia, p. 188)

Sheikh Energizer al-Bunny

I read this Telegraph article the other day that reports on Sheikh Omar Bakri's recent "address" to a "conference" in the UK...from his current location in Lebanon. You might recall that Bakri fled the UK for Lebanon after the 7/7 bombings.  Now he's back (if only as teleconferenced voice), causing trouble once again. 

Bakri told his followers: "The existence of the Islamic state is a necessity for justice to be established, a necessity for the people in order to keep away from personal desire and greed. "I believe the way forward is Islam. It is time to go back to basics. I believe Islam is the future."

The conference was organised by Bakri's right-hand man Anjem Choudary. the former head of the extremist group Al Muhajiroun. A panel of three other speakers also spoke at the gathering to mark 85 years since the Islamic state Khilasah was abolished by Kemal Ataturk in 1924.

If British officials thought they may have been given a quick bargain by his self-imposed skedaddle, they've paid a heavy price anyway.  His indefatigable efforts to sow his Salafist-Jihadist seeds continues to bear ugly, rancid fruit.  And he'll continue to sow his evil seeds, because his dawah is the primary purpose of his jihad.  It's spiritual, not ideological.  He'll talk until he's dead, and then all those videos and fatwas will live on after him.

In other words, he'll never shut up.

UPDATE: The Pest (http://revolution.thabaat.net/?p=1022) just reminded me that the US has it's own Sheikh Bunny: Anwar al-Awlaki.

Patience

...while I figure out how to use Facebook.  In the meantime, I'm quite entertained by Thomas' reports of Abu Muhammed al-Maqdisi's tribulations.

A Labor of Love

I'll be honest: there are times I wish I knew Arabic.  But then reality sinks in, and I remember that I have known native Arabic speakers who have a hard time with some of Salafist-Jihadist material.  The materials' technical jurisprudential lexicon make it all hard going for the average contemporary Arabic speaker.   

The fact is much of the Salafist-Jihadist argument, and thus most of its communications, are designed for other Muslims, in the context of Islamic jurisprudence.   Its jurisprudential arguments are full of legalistic, technical terms that make many translators go crazy.  However,  the material produced for a general Muslim population -- what I call "jihad lite" --  tends to be less technical, more personal. 

Like this English language laboor of love:

http://caravansofmartyrs.atspace.com/

Review Available

My review of Brynjar Lia's Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of Al Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus'ab Al-Suri is available in the new issue of Political Studies Review.  [Scroll down to about the midway point.]

A Hodgepodge of Articles and Reports

Consider this the blogging version of a stack browsing in a library's periodical room.

There's a new issue of the International Journal of Middle East Studies

The current issue of Studies in Conflict and Terrorism

The current issue of Journal of Palestine Studies
Including, "Secrets and Lies: The Persecution of Muhammad Salah (Part II)."

From recent issues of The Middle East Quarterly

Jemaah Islamiyah Adopts the Hezbollah Model: Assessing Hezbollah's Influence

Fethullah Gülen's Grand Ambition: Turkey's Islamist Danger

An Analysis of Al-Qa'ida's Worldview: Reciprocal Treatment or Religious Obligation?

The current issue of CTC's Sentinel

From the current issue of Terrorism and Political Violence

Canada (En)Counters Terrorism: U.S.-Canada Relations and Counter-terrorism Policy

Is Islamist Terrorism More Dangerous?: An Empirical Study of Group Ideology, Organization, and Goal Structure

From the past

Islam and communism : a conference sponsored by the Institute for the Study of the USSR at the Carnegie International Center, New York City, June 25, 1960 (1960)

From Scribd

Something called Chapter 4: Islamic Laws on War and Peace

And then there's

ISLAMIC RULINGS ON WARFARE - Youssef H. Aboul-Enein Sherifa Zuhur

Also of interest, the collection created by a student of Islamic banking

Via the US Army's School of Advanced Military Studies

Can the United States Defeat Radical Islam?
by Martin E. Hanratty, PhD

A drop of fuel

While cleaning out my files, I found the below OSC translation from early 2008. I have posted other OSC translations of related material in the past, but this one is something I hadn't seen before, or just forgot about. 

There are several different analytical interpretations of Sayyid Imam's recent Revisions.  My sense is that it's less than it looks, but there are persuasive arguments to the contrary.  I'm not denying that Imam's revisions hurt AQ, they certainly have.  However I am reluctant to finalize any conclusions on his work, because we have very little reliable information at this time on what the real impact -- if any -- he will have on AQ's stream of money and men.  It will take some time.  I hope I'm wrong.

As for now, here's a little fuel for the analytical fire. 
===================

On 5 February, a jihadist website posted a statement issued by the Al−Nida Media Center entitled "The Allegations of Human Rights in Egypt, " condemning the human rights situation in Egyptian prisons and the violations that are taking place to persuade the proselytizer shaykhs to endorse Sayyid Imam's 'Revisions and Rationalizations.' The author portrayed the Egyptian Security Service as pro−American and pro−Zionist and of practicing the worst means and methods to curtail the Islamic Dawa in the land of Egypt. The statement, dated 28 January, is signed by the Al−Nida Media Centre."

A translation of the statement follows:

In name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

'And they ill−treated them for no other reason than that they believed in Allah, Exalted in Power, Worthy of all Praise'. (Koranic verse; Al−Buruj 85:8) "Praise be to God, prayers and peace be upon the Messenger of God, his family
and companions.

"For a long time, the Egyptian security services were accustomed to pursuing the monotheist mujahidin and their supporters. The sharia outlaws (Egyptian security service) applied all pursuit methods of prosecution and oppression against the people of monotheism, Dawa and Jihad.

"We have only seen them (security service) protecting the Zionist border, preventing the mujahidin from going there and guarding the leaders of the Zionist entity who arrive in the land of Egypt.

"We are not accustomed to seeing anyone of them (security services) moved by Muslim zeal and pulling out and directing their firearm toward the Zionists who arrive and walk safely in the land of Egypt, while its monotheist people are deprived of (such privileges) such as the captive Shaykh Umar Abd−al−Rahman, may God set him free, and the mujahid Shaykh Dr. Ayman al−Zawahiri and the immigrant mujahid Shaykh Muhammad Khalil al−Hakaymah and other sons of Egypt.

"There is no doubt that the pro−American and pro−Zionist security services have conducted over the years, the worst intelligence means and methods to curtail the Islamic Dawa in the land of Egypt.

"This became crystal clear when the non−believing Egyptian organs (security services), executed the proselytizer Shaykh Sayyid Qutb and his colleagues, may God have mercy on them. The security services also pursued and tortured the proselytizer Shaykh Abd−al−Hamid Kishk, may God have mercy on him, and the captive Shaykh Umar Abd−al−Rahman, may God set him free.

"Today we see the determination of these organs to continue to meddle with the constituents of Dawa and Jihad, to prevent the nation from its glorious history and to guarantee that it will not return to its forthcoming caliphate.

"The apostate Egyptian security services are continuing in the application of their cheap methods to curtail the Islamic Dawa, through what are known as the Revisions and lately the Rationalizations (of Jihad). These organs took advantage of the psychological conditions, detention and captivity suffered by our mujahidin brothers in the prisons of the tyrant of Egypt. They intended to entrench in their minds the concept of 'Revisions and Rationalizations' to implement their malicious scheme to lead astray the Salafi Muslims of the right path, by tempting them with release from prison, non−pursuit and other
(temptations).

"The captive brothers, may God set them free and break their chains, whom God made steadfast of those who are holding embers in the palms of their hands, declared their position and refused (to cave in) by rejecting both the Revisions and the Rationalizations, while some surrendered under the pressure of pain and detention. They (the rejectionists) announced clearly, that there are no Revisions or Rationalizations with the tyrant's soldiers, and called for the need to complete the path of Dawa and Jihad to confront the American Zionist arrogance, to liberate the hol y sites, to ensure the release of all prisoners and detainees in the tyrants' prisons all over the world, and the application of Islamic Sharia over the entire world.

"Detained and suffering brothers:

"Despite the Egyptian regime's recent media uproar in stressing its respect for human rights, they continued their pressure and harassment policies against those rejecting Sayyid Imam's revisions. The security forces in Egypt deported all Islamist detainees from the Al−Marj prison − in which some service projects will soon be opened − to prevent the detainees from meeting with representatives of human rights organizations, or any media outlets and thus revealing their views in rejection of those Revisions and in which their views are being forged.

"Recently, the security services conducted nightly inspection campaigns and removed a number of the rejectionists to the state security slaughter house at its main headquarters, (among them) Shaykh Ahmad Ashush, Muhammad al−Maghriby and Amin Mishaly from Al−Wadi al−Gadid prison, and Muhammad Hijazi and Abd−al−Munim al Daydamuni from Natarun Wahid prison, and Jalal Abu−al−Futuh and Tariq Abu−al−Azm from the maximum security prison in Abu−Zabal.

"These measures come within the framework of the voice silencing policy, especially after the request by Shaykh Ahmad Ashush to debate Sayyid Imam on the air. The statement issued by Shaykh Muhammad Hijazi in which he exposes the malicious role played by Muntasir al−Zayat in the conspiracy of Sayyid Imam

(The statement is: "Muntasir al−Zayat and the issue of penetration from within, " by Shaykh Muhammad Hijazi − may God protect him.). Until now, visitations are not allowed to the Liman Abu−Zabal prison, the maximum security (prison) at Abu−Zabal and the Turah prison, so as to isolate them (the detainees) from the outside world and force them (to endorse) the Revisions.

"Monday, 20/01/1429 corresponding to 28/01/2008
"Markaz al−Nida al− I'lami
"Source: Al−Nida Media Centre

Dissenters

UPDATE (12/17):  Nate at the Egypt blog kindly took me to task for not distinguishing between the Western mainstream media narrative and Arab mainstream media narrative.  He pointed out that the mainstream Arab (particularly Egyptian) media has been far more skeptical about the influence of Dr. Fadl's work. 

My bad. When I wrote "mainstream narrative" below I meant Western media's narrative.   There is a difference, and one worth keeping in mind for any future analysis.

========================

The Shack points out a weekend report on 200 Jihad group prisoners who are rejecting Dr. Fadl's work:

The 200 are calling for Sayyid Imam to face them in a debate, covered by the media, free of any intervention by the Security forces.

This isn't the first time a group of hard core Jihad group prisoners rejected Dr. Fadl's revisions.  The same thing happened back in January 08, and I linked to the subsequent file here:  "Jihad Leaders in Egyptian Prisons Reject Sayyid Imam's Ideological Revisions."

Back in March I linked to Imam's last work before being taken into custody, "Terrorism Is from Islam and Whoever Denies That Is an Infidel."  I don't have the original Arabic, only the open source translation.  I only point this out to add a bit of dimension to the dialogue on the long term efficacy of Imam's recent book, expertly covered at Jihadica. 

The mainstream narrative is one that sees Imam's revisions and attacks as a death blow to AQ's cause.  My shrug is existential rather than particular.  Until I see a decline in young men seeking AQ's vision of violent jihad as a means of sanctification, I'm inclined to see this as a good but limited event in the fight against violent Salafist-Jihadist movements.

Recent Article Roundup

From the current issue of Critical Studies on Terrorism, vol 1 # 3, December 2008

Torture and terrorism: an interview with Moazzam Begg
Author: George Kassimeris a

Six rather unexplored assumptions about al-Qaeda
Author: Joshua Alexander Geltzer

Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol 31 #12, December 2008

Al Qaeda's Operational Intelligence—A Key Prerequisite to Action
Gaetano Joe Ilardi

Abstract

For Al Qaeda, intelligence is a critical operational resource. Its vigorous collection, scrutiny, and dissemination within the organization have proven fundamental to its capacity to engage in carefully crafted acts of terrorism...

Mediterranean Quarterly, 2008 Vol 19 #4

Disarming Hezbollah
Brent J. Talbot and Heidi Harriman

Abstract
Hezbollah has become a powerful yet destabilizing force in Lebanon, affecting internal stability, allowing Syria and Iran dangerous influence, delaying peace with Israel, and complicating the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Moreover, it forces the United States to struggle between traditional support for Israel and newfound support for Lebanese democracy...

Examining the Case for War: Allegations of Iranian Interference in Iraq
Philip Giraldi

Abstract

Iran poses two fundamental challenges to the United States. First is its alleged program to develop a nuclear weapon, which is currently being negotiated and which might be managed and contained through concerted international action. Second, and more threatening in the long term, are its roles as a regional hegemon and as a participant in the political development of neighboring Iraq...

The Regional and International Implications of Kosovo Independence
Gordon N. Bardos

Abstract
The support of the United States and some European Union countries for Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence has in many ways contributed to a deterioration of the security situation in southeastern Europe...

 

Journal of Palestine Studies, Autumn 2008, Vol. 38, # 1

Secrets and Lies: The Persecution of Muhammad Salah (Part II)

In this two-part exclusive report, Salah's lawyers recount for the first time the details of their client's labyrinthine case. ...Part II focuses on the post-9/11 period that unfolded under the George W. Bush Justice Department, starting with Salah's indictment in November 2004, continuing with the two years of contentious pretrial preparations and hearings, and ending with the trial itself. As in part I, the legal dimensions of the case are emphasized, as are the government's maneuvers to advance new standards governing the admissibility of coerced confessions and secret evidence at trial and to manipulate other established principles of the U.S. criminal justice system.

Lashkar-e-Tayyiba Thwarted Plots [ver 2]

We're finally receiving reliable information on the Mumbai attack, and it's clear that Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) is the group responsible.  For many folks this may have been the first time they've heard of the group, but I've been studying thwarted plots since 2004, and in nearly every case there was some LeT connection.   Either the plotters trained in LeT camps, directed by LeT handlers, or LeT members.  Many of these failed plots shared elements seen in Mumbai.  It's as if LeT had been attempting Mumbai-like attacks for a long time.  After numerous attempts in the UK, Australia, and the US, they succeeded in India.  

Here's a list of the failed plots that included some connection to Let. I'm working from memory, folks. I'll write down what I can remember off the top of my head now, and return to this tomorrow (tomorrow's edits will be in green):

2000-2004, "Operation Crevice":  British Muslims -- most of Pakistani descent -- were arrested in early 2004 after plotting to bomb a dance club, a shopping mall, and other sites.  The cell also included a Canadian, Momin Khawaja and had connections with an American, Junaid Babar.

2000-2004, "Banks Plot":  Lead by AQ's emir in the UK - Issa al-Hindi -- the plot included targets in NYC's financial district, including a former Jewish center, financial institutions in Philadelphia and Washington, DC.  Al-Hindi's professional reconnaissance reports and videos of the intended targets were discovered after his arrest.  His time operating in Kashmir for LeT, also known as "The Army of Madinah," is immortalized in The Army of Madinah in Kashmir (see my study here).

2001-2003, Lodhi-Brigitte Plot.  An early Australian plot to target Australia's electric power grid and attack different sites around Sydney ended in November 2003 Australian officials arrested a French convert to Islam  -- Willie Brigitte -- who had received training in a Lashkar camp.  According to court records he was directed to go to Australia by an LeT handler and hook up with Faheem Lodhi. 

Also note that members of the Virginia Jihad Network testified at Faheem Lodhi's trial.

2002-2005, London 7/7: Four men bombed the London transportation systems.  Ayman al-Zawahiri claimed responsibility for the attacks.  At least one of the bombers -- Shehzad Tanweer -- attend LeT madrasa in Pakistan.

2003-2005, Lodi Case.  Hamid Hayat attends a LeT camp where he is trained to attack financial and government buildings.

2004-2006, "Operation Pendennis": 22 men were arrested in cells based in Melbourne (and Sydney) was plotting attacks on the Melbourne Stock Exchange and a train station among other targets including tourist sites in Sydney.  Several of the members had received training in an LeT camp.

2004-2006, "Airliner Plot:"  Members of the UK based cell plotting to detonate sophisticated liquid explosives on 10 jumbo airliners crossing the Atlantic were associated with "charitable" services in Kashmir. 

January 2008, Barcelona Case:  Spanish authorities arrest 14 people, most from the subcontinent in a plot that they described at the time as an attack like Madrid. "The detainees were part of a terrorist sleeper cell which was activated from Pakistan with the arrival in Spain of one of their members, who acted as liaison with the leadership of Al-Qaida, the report said."

This list wasn't meant to be comprehensive, only illustrative of LeT's oeprational persistance.  It's not just a "Kashmir" group, and it hasn't been for quite some time.  The questions now are: why? how? and who?  And my favorite: where does AQ end and LeT begin?

Three on Dr. Fadl

Now that the dust is settling on the serialization of Sayyid Imam's new book, some bloggers are wondering what it was all about. Count me among the skeptical. As an example of the skepticism, see Rob's post on an article in the Egyptian newspaper al-Dostor that included an interview with the ubiquitous Montasser al-Zayyat:

Zayat said that because of Sayyid Imam’s new book,  the Revisions process has lost some of its value.  Whereas before, the discussions were serious and were based on legitimate Islamic scholarship, Sayyid Imam’s Revisions have turned into an exchange of personal insults between Zawahiri and Imam.   Not seeing anything of value in the latest Revisions, “this will push the  youth to revert to the  Internet and the traditional Jihadist sources which justified the use of violence.”

Will at Jihadica counters mine and other bloggers' skepticism with some good arguments of his own, such as:

Sayyid Imam has a different goal in this book.  He’s already tried to discredit the religious underpinnings of Zawahiri’s ideology.  Now he’s trying to impugn his character.  Zawahiri has said that for the Jihadi Movement to succeed it needs leaders that people can trust.  Sayyid Imam is trying to destroy that trust.  Think of political attack ads; Imam’s gone from attacking Zawahiri on the issues, now he’s attacking his character.

I'm always opened to persuasion. The fact is we won't be able to "measure" the effectiveness Imam's efforts for months, if not years.

Asharq al-Awsat recently profiled the man:

He is Al-Sayyid Imam Abd-al-Qadir Imam al-Sharif and known in the jihadist circles by the name of Dr. Fadl or Sheikh Abdul-Qadir Bin-Abdulaziz, leader and ideological theoretician of the Egyptian "Jihad" group some of whose members took part in the assassination of late Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat. Ayman al-Zawahiri, Al-Qaeda organization's second-in-command at present, was one of the group's most prominent leaders. Though real information about Dr. Fadl's is not enough to dispel much of the mystery around this important figure, there are still seven places in his life which were full of important events and which recorded the career of this controversial and mysterious figure.