Making Sense of Jihad

Around the World

In Iraq:  Al Qaeda is moving on (via GulfNews)

Baghdad: Some groups of Al Qaida terror network in Iraq have started leaving the country towards other hot spots in Africa like Sudan and Somalia, security sources tell Gulf News. A key reason behind the change in strategy by the so-called Al Qaida Organisation in Mesopotamia is the intensity of the latest military strikes launched by Iraqi and US forces against the network, which has been the major challenge to restoring the stability of Iraq, the sources said....A source at Iraqi Ministry of National Security said that documents and letters found in hideouts of "some elements of Al Qaida" during search operations in Sunni suburbs in Baghdad, which were previously under the control of Al Qaida, "prove these elements left Iraq for Somalia and Sudan".  The information, which could not be confirmed by independent sources, could represent a victory for the Iraqi government, headed by Nouri Al Maliki..

In Italy (via AKI)

Milan, 7 July (AKI) - The President of the northern Italian city of Milan, Filippo Penati, has triggered widespread debate with a controversial proposal to fine Muslims who pray on the streets outside the city's mosque.  According to authorities, the number of people praying on the sidewalk creates traffic and obstacles for pedestrians in the area surrounding the Viale Jenner mosque, a converted garage.

and this (via AKI)

Rome, 7 July (AKI) - Abdellatif Ibrahim Fatayer, one of the men convicted of hijacking the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro in 1985, was freed in Rome on Monday. Fatayer, who was born in the Tel al-Zaatar Palestinian refugee camp north of the Lebanese capital, Beirut, is the youngest of the hijackers. According to the Italian daily, Corriere della Sera, Fatayer was expected to be deported from Italy after serving a 21-year sentence plus three years under police surveillance. But Lebanon refused to accept him after he was freed from jail.

In Pakistan (via AKI/DAWN)

Khar, 7 July (AKI/DAWN) - Pro-Taliban militants in Pakistan have established Sharia or Islamic courts in the Bajaur tribal region which borders Afghanistan.  A large number of people are believed to be waiting to use the courts established by the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan in order to resolve disputes instead of waiting for action by the tribal administration. The courts have been functioning for a couple of weeks in the Sewai area, about 20 kilometres northwest of Khar, the regional headquarters of Bajaur tribal region.

In Washington, DC (via Danger Room)

Ha hahahahahhaha ha ha  ha  ha aaaaah

UPDATE (07/12/08): Okay, I knew this, but it's still funny.

50% 90% -- What's the Dif?

The last we heard of the Saudi CT raid of 2008, about 50% of the suspects came from other countries.  This morning, we find a different number all together.  In an interview with Saudi security minister Prince Nayef at Al Sharq al Awsat (via BBC Monitoring and the Al Sharq English site):

[Al Sharq al Awsat] What was the percentage of Saudi nationals that were apprehended in the five terrorist cells that you dismantled and announced that last week?

[Prince Nayif] Unfortunately, the percentage of Saudis was high; it was about 90 per cent.

[Al Sharq al Awsat] What about the terrorist schemes that the cells intended to implement? Had they reached advanced stages in planning and preparation?

[Prince Nayif] Praise is to God, we had them under surveillance. We did not allow them to reach stages that threaten the installations. But we do not rule out the possibility that they may have other plans and alternative plans. We anticipate anything and we take into account all plans whether big or small.

And so much for the Iran angle mentioned in articles posted at Jihadica:

[Al Sharq al Awsat] Finally, are the terrorist threats targeting Saudi Arabia planned by individuals or organizations or states?

[Prince Nayif] No doubt, they are planned by organizations. We have no evidence to show that they are planned by states and it may be unlikely. We depend on nothing but facts.

What to believe coming from Saudi officials?  The fifty percent number of the ninety percent number? The analytical outcomes are dramatically different depending on that number.  If it's 50% then AQ leaders were able to perform the rather amazing feat of global targeted recruitment through their distributed networks for a specific plot.  If it's the 90% estimate then the Saudis still have a dramatic systemic internal problem on their hands.  This all factors in to the evolving character of the threat to Saudi energy infrastructure (some of the most sensitive and important sites on earth at the moment given the price of oil).

In the meantime, the Saudi Interior Ministry needs to improve their public information efforts, coordinating their story between higher ups and subordinates. If they don't then analysts like me are going to start relying on AQ for data on their thwarted plots, even if they continue to capture and reeducate former editors of Sawt al-Jihad.

UPDATE (7/5/08):

Will McCants at Jihadica e-mailed to point out that, "The Saudi security official said the cell is taking orders from someone in Iran.  That doesn't necessarily mean state involvement, so there's no contradiction." Consider me corrected, Will.  Thanks for pointing this out.

Still Top Down

I'm not one to inhale all the drama that usually accompanies a NY Times expose, but this quote from yesterday's article on the hunt of AQ in Pakistan, just stood out,

Some architects of America's efforts in Pakistan defend the Bush administration's record in the tribal areas, and vigorously deny that Washington took its eye off the terror threat as it focused on Iraq policy. Some also question whether Bin Laden and Zawahri, Al Qaeda's top two leaders, are really still able to orchestrate large-scale attacks.

"I do wonder if it's in fact the case that Al Qaeda has really reconstituted itself to a pre-9/11 capability, and in fact I would say I seriously doubt that," said Crocker, the American ambassador to Pakistan between 2004 and 2006 and currently the ambassador to Iraq.

"Their top-level leadership is still out there, but they're not communicating and they're not moving around. I think they're symbolic more than operationally effective," Crocker said.

Really?  And the Zawahiri connection to recent Saudi raids is nothing?  I'll give the former Ambassador to Pakistan the benefit of the doubt and accept the premise that he may have a different definition of "operationally effective" than I do.

However, I just can't accept the idea that there's no real command and control going on within the group.  In the last paragraph of today's NY Times article on AQIM (noted in the previous post) offers another hint that AQ remains a top-down organization, with the goal toward spectacular attacks:

Intelligence agents intercepted yet another message between headquarters and the Algeria branch this year. Mr. Zawahri sent Mr. Droukdal a private message, according to a top German intelligence official, noting that controversial Danish cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad were set to be republished. He asked Mr. Droukdal to help in taking revenge.

There's also his role in the London bombings, and his letter to Zarqawi that shows that he took at least some interest in Z-man's questionable tactics in Iraq.  Far from being symbolic, Zawahiri appears to be as scheming as ever, directing the recruitment and funding of large scale attacks in KSA.  If he has time for KSA, I don't see why he wouldn't have time for Europe, the US, or even China. 

Regardless of the current analytical fad of describing AQ as a "fifth generation" org, or a leaderless global movement of miscreants, or whatever, recent news suggests that it remains very much a seventh century sort of group: top-down.

Saudi Response - And the plot itself

Given the current hysterics over the price of gas here in the US, you would think that something like the thwarting of a third large scale attack against oil installations in Saudi Arabia would garner a bit more attention.  But, the only news trickling out about this week's arrests are in the Saudi and other Peninsula papers. 

What's interesting is the scope of the plot. It appears to have been as ambitious as the ones from previous years.  It included a maritime element to attack "offshore" facilities (ie. Ras Tanura).

Saudi Gazette (via BBC monitoring - no link), notes what Will at Jihadica discusses here, that the plotters were informed by Abu Bakr al-Naji's Management of Savagery.

[Maj. Gen. Mansour Al-Turki] told Okaz that investigations conducted with the arrested terrorist groups revealed that they were working under a strategy mentioned in the seized books talking about "the management of barbarism" (Idarat At-Tawahhush).

Back in September 2005, I noted that this book could reflect al-Qaida's "current operational thinking:"

As for the larger attacks on petroleum infrastructure, he offers a step-by-step ideological, media, and physical plan of attack.First, the movement’s experts would gather data to support their claims of injustice.   In this case, “an economic specialist among its member can conduct a study that demonstrates the real value and real price of oil…” The report would go on to show the “extent of the unfairness and plunder to which the nation was subjected for decades…”

Second, the movement would demand that all countries that import oil should pay the fair price, “while preserving the Muslim people’s right to demand payment that would cover the price discrepancy throughout all previous years.”

Third, a period of time would be given, in his words, “to assess the degree of responsiveness to this declaration.”  If nothing happens, then “attack would begin on the oil installation, particularly the pipelines, the bombing of which does not involve killing people.  The oil tankers that are managed and operated by infidels would be attacked.  Oil installation and refineries would be attacked at such times when that are empty of workers to avoid hurting Muslims persons.”  However, he adds, regarding the “sentries” at oil installations:  if they are members of the local army they should be “treated as traitors to their nations” and as for private security companies, “They may be attacked only if they try to kill or capture some of the attacking mujahideen…”

Saudis thwarting a large-scale attack is getting to be a regular summer event, like July 4th or the shorebird migration.  It's a sign of their CT efforts that many of the plotters appear to have been from countries other than Saudi Arabia, but next year may be a difference story, since even more Iraq and Afghan-hardened mujahideen will have returned to their homelands on the Peninsula.

Perhaps more important than countering these cells, is getting to the brains of these energy plots (which are clearly top-down affairs):  Ayman al-Zawahiri.

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UPDATE:  Via MEMRI Economic Blog (emphasis mine)

Saudis Reveal that Terrorists Were Targeting Oil Installations in Gulf Countries
06/27/2008

High-level Saudi security officials told the Kuwaiti daily, al-Qabas, that members of a terrorist cell, some non-Saudis, arrested by the Saudi security forces, were planning to sabotage oil installations in the Gulf countries. They were also planning to use speed boats to carry on attacks against off-shore installations and ships. The Saudi authorities added that the terrorists were planning to carry out their attacks at a big distance from their base of operations. Pictures of major hotels frequented by visitors in some major Gulf cities and city maps were also confiscated.

al-Qabas, June 27, 200

Good News Out of KSA

The wires are reporting tonight that Saudi officials have announced the result of another multi-month nationwide roundup of AQ members.  Like in previous years, there were energy facility targets in the plotting.  According to this Reuters report, Zawahiri was in some way helping coordinate the attack planning:

Some planned to use car bombs to attack an oil installation and a security target in coordination with Al Qaeda second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahri, who had planned to send fighters from Iraq, Afghanistan and North Africa to help them, the ministry statement said.

"Security forces managed to arrest one cell in the Eastern Province led by African residents ... their concern was to get close to people working in the oil sector in order to find work in oil installations," it said.

The make up of the arrested cells is interesting:

There were 40 Mauritanians among those held in the province, as well as Afghans, Iraqis and Yemenis, a security source said

Yemenis should be expected, but Mauritanians?  AQ has had some success targeting Africans from the Sahel  for recruitment.  March reports of fund raising arrests hinted at a possible Zawahiri role in ongoing Peninsula plot coordination.  Current news suggests that Dr. Z is directing any efforts to attack energy infrastructure on the Peninsula. It also suggests that regardless of current analytical fads, AQ remains very much a top down organization.

Some CT analysts will dismiss any threat to the region's infrastructure by pointing to AQ's failure at Abqaiq in Feb 2006.  But it's important to remember that the Saudis have thwarted ambitious, large scale attacks targeting energy facilities every year since 2005.  Consider then the complete time line of attacks and near-operational attacks which includes:

1. Ad Dammam (September 2005) - near operational
2. Abqaiq (February 2006)
3. Planes plot (April-July 2007) - near operational
4. 2008 Plot (June 2008) - TBA

I've said before that our national economic security rests in part on the success of Saudi CT efforts.  For the time being, they remain effective. 

Something to Keep in Mind

Crossroads Arabia notes something that has gone unexplained and unconsidered in the cacophony of complaints and half-solutions to our current energy woes:

Something the piece seems to neglect, though, is that petroleum use is far more than simply what we put into gas tanks. We depend on petroleum in almost all aspects of our lives, from the plastics we use to the synthetic fibers we wear. It’s used in making fertilizers and pesticides, in shipping our foods to disposing our wastes. Even if we stop burning it in vehicles, we’re still going to be dependent on oil supplies until there’s no more oil to be had. Then we’re going to have to synthesize oil or find substitutes. Petroleum use is here for the long haul. Burning it in cars and factories is perhaps the least important use, though that use is critical today.

Let me add to the list petrolatum:  petroleum jelly.  It's an important additive to most hand and body lotions.  Or the blacktop in your driveway or on the road.  Or...

Now's Your Chance

Secrecy News notes that DHS has undertaken the unusual step of publishing a "request for comment" announcement in the Federal Register.  Basically, the agency is requesting feedback -- "suggestions and comments" -- on revisions to its National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP).  The comment period closes on July 7th.  So the door is closing fast on your opportunity to contribute to policy-making process, particularly as it relates to our critical infrastructure, like energy facilities.

ABCA?

It stands for "America, British, Canada, and Australia," and Kings of War has the info.

Iraqi Pipelines

Washington Times reports that there's been a "sharp drop" in oil pipeline attacks in Iraq from "an average of 30 month in 2007 to only four last month." 

The pipelines in the northern part of the country have been the most targeted, in a strategy by local Sunni radical groups (including Al Qaida) to disrupt the flow of oil, and thus make it difficult, if not impossible, for Northern Oil company to bring enough product to market.  Pipelines are resilient targets.  Just one attack does little or nothing to their effectiveness.  They need to be targeted repeatedly over a long period of time.  Al Qaida (or other Sunni groups) figured this out, but thankfully, the surge is working in the north.   This may also help with the global price, since Iraq output is factored into global supplies.  More Iraqi product coming onto the market, means more global supply.  The price may drop.

However, there's more than one type of infrastructure within an industry that can be targeted for disruption, including the corporate hierarchy and its employees.  This does not necessarily mean murders and assassinations (though the tactic plays an important role), but could mean internal sabotage of key computer support networks, or even union unrest.  I suspect that if Iran meddles with the Iraqi oil sector, they are more likely to take this approach.

Surprising Results?

Here's a potentially interesting article:

The Surprising Results of the Saudi Arabian 2004 Demographic Census
International Journal of Middle East Studies (2008), 40:12-15
ONN WINCKLER

Abstract
At first glance, in contrast to political documents, official demographic data, particularly total population figures, “look innocent.” The common tendency is to accept them “as is” because governments tend not to manipulate the declared number of their citizens. In most cases this assumption is true. Is it also true for Saudi Arabia?...

A Avoidable RiskNeedless Uncertainty

UPDATE 06/21:  Hugh Hewitt featured an interview with a corporate security expert named Frank Dowse (I can't find a transcript of the interview).  Dowse, a former Marine, consults with American corporations that do business overseas, particularly with protecting their personnel.  He mentioned something that stuck with me, and is, I think, a better way of describing our "energy policy;"  paraphrased:  there's a difference between risk and uncertainty. 

Rather than say we have put ourselves in the way of avoidable risk, it's far more accurate to say we've created conditions of needless uncertainty.  There are too many factors that need to go right all the time in order to maintain the fragile balance between supply and demand.  It doesn't need to be this way.

=======================================

There's news tonight that the Iowa flooding has devastated the corn crop in the state.  What does this have to do with risk?  With terrorism?  Our regressive environmental policies have, once again, made our economy vulnerable to terrorist activity outside the country. 

Iowa corn is primarily used in the production of ethanol.  Ethanol is a required additive to gasoline.  If ethanol production is affected by the cost and availability of corn, then this will hit the price of gas at the pump.  Do you think filling your tank is tough now?  Wait a week.

What does this have to do with terrorism?  High oil prices are causing pain all over the world, particularly in the price of staple foods like rice and corn.  Americans feel it most at the gas station, but it has ripple effects from the cost of food to the cost of clothes, electronics, etc.  Practically everything that's made overseas and imported into the country is going to cost more. 

This makes our economy particularly vulnerable to large scale attacks on "critical" energy infrastructure sites outside the country, like Saudi oil processing facilities.  The pressures placed on the economy by the ethanol requirement have made us even more vulnerable to forces out of our control, like flooding and Saudi counterterrorism capabilities.

A Little Dose of Reality

SITE Intel Group has published a Bruce Hoffman response to the recent surge in "optimism" among "a succession of senior Bush Administration officials, intelligence officers, pundits, newspaper columnists, academicians and other knowledgeable observers."

Hoffman notes some of the same phenomenon I do in my post on the subject, "Embellishments of Hope," including the fact that public opinion polls don't matter as much as some of the reports suggest:

Further, as welcome as the declines in popular opinion may be, there still remains a solid, hardcore base of support for al-Qaeda from which the movement can continue to draw upon for recruits and support. Appealing to this hard core of like-minded radicals and extremists, which has traditionally been al-Qaeda’s political base, is arguably today the movement’s most important priority. Indeed, it is only when this core erodes that the beginning of the end of al-Qaeda can more confidently be proclaimed. Indeed, al-Qaeda’s efforts to preserve this base may be behind the dramatic upsurge in al-Qaeda’s communications that SITE has tracked over the past two years and which I discussed in this newsletter’s first issue.

Perhaps it was my (brief) time at the Bureau that convinced me of it, but until I see the money stop flowing, I won't be convinced the group is on its last legs.  The primary benefit to this little piece, however, is in its reminder of how our initial conclusions have been generally wrong:

Similarly, al-Qaeda’s involvement in the August 2006 plot was at first also roundly dismissed. One contemporary New York Times story, for instance, reported that the consensus among “counterterrorism experts” was that al-Qaeda “remains useful shorthand for the news media and for officials who want to tap the powerful emotions associated with the September 11 attacks. But to suggest that the terrorist threat today is represented by the organization directly commanded by Osama bin Laden is to oversimplify a complex international movement the specialists say.” One of the experts interviewed, Marc Sageman, was quoted as stating, “There is no such thing as al-Qaeda as it existed before we went to Afghanistan and destroyed it. We won the war against the old al-Qaeda.”[9] Yet, in the time since the plot was uncovered, evidence has repeatedly come to light that a succession of key veteran al-Qaeda senior commanders - including Abu Faraj al-Libi, the mastermind of two assassination attempts on President Pervez Musharraf in 2003 and the movement’s reputed number three; Abu Hamza Rabia, his successor; and Abu Ubaidah al-Masri, then al-Qaeda’s commander for Kunar Province, Afghanistan - were responsible for directing the spectacularly ambitious, and potentially lethally horrific, airline bombings plot.

New article on Morocco

The Evolution of Jihadist Terrorism in Morocco

Authors: Rogelio Alonso - Dr Rogelio Alonso; Marcos Garca Rey
Published in:  Terrorism and Political Violence, Volume 19, Issue 4 December 2007 , pages 571 - 592

Abstract
Over the last few years, Moroccans have been disproportionately involved in jihadist terrorism. Morocco has been increasingly identified as one of the largest producers of terrorists and insurgents in Afghanistan, Iraq, and throughout Europe. This article examines the factors behind the emergence of jihadist terrorism in Morocco, and how this terrorist threat has gone beyond this country's borders. Three factors have contributed to this development: the influence of global jihad on potential Moroccan jihadists; the growing Islamization of the country; and deteriorating socioeconomic conditions. In analyzing these variables, special attention will be paid to the Casablanca terrorist attacks on May 16, 2003, marking the debut of suicide terrorism in Morocco. The article will also examine the principal counterterrorist initiatives Morocco has implemented in response to this threat.

Jihad Leaders in Egyptian Prisons Reject Sayyid Imam's Ideological Revisions

On 4 January, a forum participant posted to a jihadist website part of a statement issued by the leaders of jihad which was released from the prisons in Egypt on 2 December 2007 in which the group rejected Sayyid Imam's ideological revision of jihad. The statement was copied from the Istikhbarat Internet blog, which had agreed to publish it "with reservation, " as stated by the administration of the blog that reports news about jihad and the mujahidin.

A translation of the statement follows:
"2 December 2007
"A Message From the 'Organization Responsible for the Affairs, Letters, and
Statements Made by the Rejecters Inside the Prisons of Egypt'
"We will not bow but to God.

"We absolutely reject all forms and manners of initiatives that may cast legitimacy on the Egyptian regime which is believed to be a secular dictatorship that is fighting God and his messengers. We call upon the Egyptian regime to repent for all the crimes it committed and still insists on committing against God and against the rights of the poor people who are tasting large doses of humiliation and disgrace night and day and are clothed in garments of poverty and hunger at the hands of this arrogant government. We assert that the jihadist factions' unanimous agreement to the document (Rationalization of Jihad) by Sayyid Imam is untrue and false, and those who publicize it are the first to know that. How can that be (true) when the majority of detainees are jihadists in the prisons of Al−Wadi al−Gadid, Al−Marg, Abu−Za'bal, the maximum security Abu−Za'bal Prison, and Wadi al−Natrun who reject this document with openness and frankness in spite of the measures of suppression against them that continued for more than 15 years and are identical to those of Abu−Ghurayb and Guantanamo Prisons.

"We assert that we have nothing to do, from near or from afar, with the one who is called Muntasir al−Zayat. He was falsely and deceivingly designated as the lawyer for Islamic groups. He is nothing but one of the country's tools to hit and discredit us. We remind public opinion that Sayyid (Imam) was with the intelligence organization for three years. He then emerged with this document that he is publicizing today when the law of suppression of 'terrorism' and the necessity for the state to release the detainees, in compliance with the law of emergency, is about to go into effect.

"We do beseech the rational and those with clear vision not to trust such a document which has come out of the womb of the Intelligence and State Security and the domes of prisons because its writer−−and to whom it is linked−−is the same person who wrote the letters 'A dialogue with Traitors is (like) a Graveyard for the (Islamic) Call and (Islamic) Preachers,' 'Realization of Monotheism by Fighting the Traitors,' 'Response to the Albanian Shaykh Concerning Silence Regarding Apostate Leaders,' and 'Disclosure of Falsehood and Vilification of the Alliance of Priests and Power.' These titles of the statements are sufficient for the one who has not read them to know what they are about.

"We support all jihad movements in the world and see in them the hope of the nation and its frontlines toward its bright future. We say to our Muslim nation that no matter how long the night may last, dawn will emerge.

"(Signed) Muhammad al−Zawahiri, Muhammad Hijazi, Muhammad al−Aswani, Muhammad Jamal, Sayyid Husni, Ahmad Salama, Ahmad Ashush, and Tawfiq al−Afni"

Accession number & update: 17XC2H5T 20080125.
Source: World News Connection, (CJFA), 24 January 2008.

Introducing "macroterrorism"

...at ubiwar.com

(more on this from me at a later date)

It's All About "Program Direction"

The New York Times article goes straight to the heart of the dust-up between Marc Sageman and Bruce Hoffman:

Officials from the White House to the C.I.A. acknowledge the importance of the debate of the two men as the government assesses the nature of the threat. Looking forward, it is certain to be used to win bureaucratic turf wars over what programs will be emphasized in the next administration.

If there is no looming main Qaeda threat — just “bunches of guys,” as Dr. Sageman calls them — then it would be easier for a new president to think he could save money or redirect efforts within the huge counterterrorism machine, which costs the United States billions of dollars and has created armies of independent security consultants and counterterrorism experts in the last seven years.

I noted this very factor yesterday, but not as a function of presidential politics.  Rather, it's just how the US federal government works. 

For those readers who may not be familiar with how this works, here's a brief description: government policy dictates program development which dictates funding.  Without a looming al Qaida threat to the homeland then the underlying argument for supporting all those CT funds becomes unstable.  It get harder for government program "leads" (called "project officers") to justify funding these CT efforts when the FY budget cycles come around.  Government project officers live and die by the amount of program money (aka "program direction") they control, and thus the pressure is always on to remain relevant to current policy in order to justify more funding.   Add to this rather mundane mix of bureaucratic processes the media meat grinder of a presidential race, and you can see where all this news is coming from. 

I've been dealing with the highs and lows of "program direction" since I began working in DC in 1992, right out of undergraduate school.  The vast majority of the jobs I had ended simply because program direction was "redirected" or pulled completely. 

Welcome to the vast military-industrial complex.

A Question Asked and Answered

Being, er, independent at the moment, I have time to attend think tank events in the DC area.  They're always interesting, if only to see certain well-known, dare I say, celebrities among conservative and liberal intellectuals.  Wednesday found me at the Hudson Institute's "2008 Bradley Symposium: Encounter at 10: The Power of Ideas."  I was curious to see Victor Davis Hanson and Andrew McCarthy in human form and hear what they had to say.

Being no one worthy of  attention, I can usually just stand by the wall and observe. One word to describe for this event: posing.  Lots and lots of posing.  To steal a term from ornithology, there were plenty of subadult males in town for summer internships, still looking awkward in their suits.  There were plenty of middle-aged white men all talking presidential politics.

I sat at a side table eating a breakfast danish and watching all the posing much like watching a raft of ducks in the water, albeit less interesting. I eventually asked myself:  Why thank tanks?  Is it possible to work an entire career within a four block radius of K Street?  And why would anyone want to do that?  Where did these places come from, and do we really need another excuse for overeducated people to pose?

I think God actually heard me, because that very night, I received an answer in the form of George Weigel.

DC's afternoon tempest left my neighborhood without electricity, and so I decided to go to a talk he was giving at the Catholic Information Center on K Street, just one block north of where I had been earlier in the day. 

At one point during Weigel's rather extemporaneous talk, he mentioned that he had worked within a four block radius of K Street for (I think he said) twenty years.  Why, because it was the think tank where the ideas that mattered were being generated.  The ideas that you will see worked out in the day-to-say policies of government are not being generated in academia.  They are being generated in think tanks.  Think tanks are, he said, the counterweight to academia in the US. 

As long as some think tanks continue to employ men like George Weigel, I think I can handle the posing.  Thanks, Mr. Weigel. 

The Problem of the Niger Delta

Nigeria's volatile situation poses a special kind of problem for US foreign policy.  The country continues to be a key source of crude oil for the US market, even as overall security degenerates.  The US Institute of Peace (USIP) recently sponsored a public meeting to explore solutions to the Gordian knot of tribes, religions, political parties, and organized crime networks:

Militia groups in the region have proliferated, often sustained by government and party officials who use the militias for their own political and economic purposes. Groups such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), which was organized in 2006, function as a loose network of gangs rather than a coherent organization. They lack a common political agenda or political wings that could participate in a negotiation process. While some groups possess legitimate grievances and goals, they also engage in criminal activities that lead to the continuation of the conflict—by doing the bidding of the politicians and others who pay them, the militia members perpetuate the governance system that contributes to the region’s problems.

The militias have become increasingly violent, both toward one another and toward civilians. Kidnapping victims now include not just oil workers, but also children and other people who are not associated with the oil industry. An influx of small arms and more sophisticated weapons into the Niger Delta from regional and international markets has led to the increased arming of the militias. They are now nearly evenly matched with the Nigerian military, which was dispatched to the region in 2003 and maintains a significant presence there. The result has been a stalemate. Politicians in the Niger Delta who fund the militias retain the lion’s share of illegally sourced wealth and are able to sustain their activities with minimal losses, raising enough revenue to pay off their patronage networks and militias. Politicians in Abuja offer plans for peace without taking action, doing little to alter the status quo.

Having once been tasked to answer the question: is al Qaida there, too?  I can at least speak to mind-numbing complexity of the problem of the Niger Delta.  It's the perfect proving ground for the next emergence of radical Islam.

A Few Things Military

From C-Span 

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Panel: American Civil-Military Relations

A panel discussion on civilian-military relations from U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (Fort Leavenworth, KS).  Panelists are: Dale Herspring, author of "Rumsfeld's Wars"; Marybeth Ulrich, author of "Democratizing Communist Militaries"; Col. Matthew Moten, author of "The Delafield Commission and the American Military Profession"; Peter Feaver, author of "Armed Servants"; and Don Snider, co-author of "The Future of the Army Profession."      

From the Congressional Research Service (CRS):

"The Army’s Future Combat System (FCS): Background and Issues for Congress,” updated May 12, 2008.

Punch Drunk Love Boat

It's been a long weekend filled with infidel doings:  wine, inter-mixing with unrelated men (aka my friends), and the weekly worship of the Trinitarian God.  Did I mention wine?  That doesn't mean I have not been reading blogs, I just haven't had time to comment, and boy there is plenty to comment on.   

That said, I just saw this Guardian article linked at Drudge:

The United States is operating "floating prisons" to house those arrested in its war on terror, according to human rights lawyers, who claim there has been an attempt to conceal the numbers and whereabouts of detainees.

Details of ships where detainees have been held and sites allegedly being used in countries across the world have been compiled as the debate over detention without trial intensifies on both sides of the Atlantic. The US government was yesterday urged to list the names and whereabouts of all those detained.

Information about the operation of prison ships has emerged through a number of sources, including statements from the US military, the Council of Europe and related parliamentary bodies, and the testimonies of prisoners.

And I couldn't help thinking of this...

Journal Snippets

From the current issue of Middle East Policy (Volume 15 Issue 2):

Lubricated with Oil: Iran-China Relations In a Changing World
Authors: Manochehr Dorraj, Carrie L. Currier

Combating Extremism: A Brief Overview of Saudi Arabia's Approach
Author: Abdullah F. Ansary

From the current issue of Middle Eastern Studies (Volume 44, Issue 3):

Bin Ladin, Palestine and al-Qa'ida's Operational Strategy
Author: Asaf Maliach

Ideology or Economic Pragmatism?: Profiling Turkish Voters in 2007
Author: Ali arkolu a

And an announcement of a new publication:  The Diplomatic Courier

The Diplomatic Courier (DC) is an innovative magazine of global affairs. It focuses on conflict resolution, diplomacy, international affairs, negotiations and concepts and theories from the widest variety of related disciplines.

Bogus or Clueless?

Things WMD-related always pique my interest since it was an area of study way back when.  And so I was curious when some eager online jihadi posted "Nuclear Jihad -- The Ultimate Terror" at the Clearinghouse on Monday night.   Several things were clear from the original Monday posting, and after viewing the video:

1. This wasn't Al Qaida
2. These weren't even well-trained amateurs
3. They had no technical understanding of nuclear weaponry
4. There wasn't any threat related to it

And so within an hour of seeing the post, downloading and viewing the video, I forgot about it.  I was surprised to see that the video made Drudge the following night.  First, I assumed the video being announced was something new, because Al Qaida has an MO with its media products, and there was nothing in the information streams that resembled their MO.  Second, the video was such a piece of crap that no one could possibly interpret it as a threat.  Right?

Shocka.

It's still unclear exactly what went wrong on the analysis side of the house, but I suspect that at least part of the reason has to do with the rather unsophisticated opinion most policymakers have of terrorist information found in open source.  The expectation is that open source data behaves just like classified data, only it's worthless because everyone can see it.  Thus when a (real) al Qaida video or audio tape is pulled off  "the Internet" -- that strange and wondrous thing that delivers e-mails to the Blackberry -- it's only understood in very abstract way. 

Without an appreciation of open source characteristics such as context and content, an analyst is merely going to interpret the information given, as is, and will probably get it wrong.  The fact is open source is a world in and of itself.  It has its own characteristics and applications outside of the classified world of managed and controlled snippets of raw intel and formal analysis.  When the two world's collide you get whatever it was that happen over the past two days.   

This probably wasn't a "prank," just a completely preventable case of the analytical meltdown in action.

Nothing's Changed

Reuters reports on a Congressional hearing yesterday that included one current and one former FBI special agent.  I'd like to dismiss this as so much anti-Administration posturing, but the testimony portrays reality that I experienced in my brief time there in 2003 :

The FBI said that in March, in an internal e-mail cited by Youssef, it was seeking permanent supervisors in its International Terrorism Operations Section 1 (ITOS 1), which tracks al Qaeda.

The e-mail said: "This is due to the fact that ITOS 1 is currently at 62 percent of its funded staffing level. It is critical to the (counterterrorism) mission that these positions be filled as soon as possible."

Last year the bureau assigned 12 staffers with no counterterrorism experience to work as international terrorism supervisors, Youssef said.

Many supervisors in such positions became discouraged, aware they were in over their heads, and warned other agents against taking similar posts, he said.

The cynic in me says:  "Wow, they got it up to 62% staffing!"  But the (former) manager in me knows that 62% of current staffing levels reflects previous years of staffing problems.  It must include high turnover rates among analysts, a phenomenon I saw and personally experienced in the time I was there.  As a matter of fact one of the unit managers joked with me about turnover, saying that the FBI was the farm team for the IC's analysts.  That was 2003.  Apparently, nothing's changed.

 

At the Speed of Government

Over at Counterterrorism Blog Jeffrey Imm is lamenting the gaping nothing that is our government's counterideology strategy:

The Washington Times reported that: "FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III revealed during the hearing that the FBI has no counterideology response other than its 'outreach' to Muslim-American communities so they 'understand the FBI' and address 'the radicalization issue'. " Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff also said nothing is being done domestically to battle Islamist extremist ideas. The department's incident management team, he said, is focused on civil rights or civil liberties -- not fighting terrorists' ideology." "Retired Vice Adm. Mike McConnell, director of national intelligence, said the intelligence community does not conduct any battle of ideas against terrorists in the United States unless there is a foreign connection."

Imm concludes with a question:

With an unresolved strategy towards an enemy that the U.S. political leadership refuses to define as other than "extremists", it is little surprise that "strategic operational planning" would leave something to be desired. But as some suggest Bin Laden's messages are sleep-worthy, key parts of the U.S. government are clearly asleep at the wheel in fighting Bin Laden's message and ideology.

What will it take to wake them up?

Imm's post reminds me of something that Mark Steyn wrote some time in 2002-03.  After reading the news that the US immigration service had finally granted Mohammed Atta his student visa, Steyn wrote (paraphrased here): you can drive a plan into the bureaucratic mindset and it just bounces right off.

The answer to Imm's question: nothing.  Right now, the political appointees are looking for new jobs.  The government employees are waiting for the new boss.  Expect a new round of political appointees to repeat the same non-answers in, say, 18 months.

Perhaps of Interest

The current issue of the journal Strategic Analysis (India's Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses) explores the insurrection and response on the Subcontinent. It's a little off-topic, but regular readers will have figured out by now that I've never been one to color inside the lines.  The articles that are perhaps of interest:

Nuclear Terrorism: No Longer a Science Fiction
Author: Reshmi Kazi
Published in:  Strategic Analysis, Volume 32, Issue 3 May 2008 , pages 477 - 494
No Abstract

Time Factor in Insurrections
Author: Dan Jakopovich
Published in:  Strategic Analysis, Volume 32, Issue 3 May 2008 , pages 359 - 365
No Abstract

Unravelling Insurgent Groups' Strategy: The Case of the National Socialist Council of Nagalim in India
Author: Namrata Goswami
Published in:  Strategic Analysis, Volume 32, Issue 3 May 2008 , pages 413 - 438
Abstract

The overall strategy of the National Socialist Council of Nagalim led by Thuingaleng Muivah and Isak Chisi Swu-NSCN (IM) presents a mixed picture, viewed through the prism of seven dimensions of organization and leadership, mobilization strategy, time, support, terrain, technology, and the issue of legitimacy...

War on Terror and its Impact on Pakistan's Kashmir Policy
Author: Smruti S. Pattanaik
Published in:  Strategic Analysis, Volume 32, Issue 3 May 2008 , pages 389 - 412
Abstract

The terrorist act of September 11, 2001, brought a revolutionary change in the international security paradigm. As the countries tried to adjust to the new security environment, the war against terror brought war closer to south Asia... It was quick to disown the Taliban. Its dilemmas were perceptible when it was confronted with the issue of dealing with terrorism in Kashmir. With international pressure mounting, Pakistan brought in some shift in its Kashmir policy.